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ABSTRACT
The Rental for Uncertainty and Oligopolistic
Equilibrium. (August 1986)
William Frank Kordsmeier, B.A., University of Dallas;
M.A., University of Arkansas
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Melvin L. Greenhut
This dissertation is concerned with the imputation of rental
income for entrepreneurial uncertainty. It begins with a review
of the historical development of rent theory. Chapter I briefly
summarizes contributions to the theory of rent from the time of
the mercantilist economists to the neoclassical era. Chapter II
considers the conditions giving rise to rents for functional
inputs. It also considers the appropriate imputational
procedures to be employed. It is shown that variable cost
imputations are consistent with Marshall's view of rents.
Chapters III and IV consider the rental income of
nonfunctional inputs. In Chapter III Greenhut's model of
entrepreneurial rents and competitive-oligopolistic equilibrium
is considered. It is shown that the rental for nonfunctional
inputs reflects the opportunity cost of the factor in question.
In Chapter IV Greenhut's model of nonfunctional inputs is
contrasted with Chamberlin's. It is shown that factor
conformability requires production at optimum efficient scale. A
utility-theoretic model of the market for entrepreneurial
uncertainty is developed. This model indicates that factor
conformability must always emerge in an industry characterized by
competitive factor markets.
Chapters V and VI are devoted to Baumol, Panzar, and
Willig's model of monopolistic competition. Chapter V summarizes
BP&W’s general theory of contestable markets. Chapter VI is more
specifically concerned with an analysis of BP&W*s behavioral
postulates and monopolistically-competitive market structures.
It is shown that BP&Wfs theory fails because their primary
behavioral postulate, namely, that firms engage in entry¬
forestalling pricing behavior, is unacceptable under the
assumption of fictionless entry and exit. Their theory also
lacks generality since it is based upon the fictional concept of
the representative firm. Contrary to BP&W’s theory, it is shown
that equilibrium is consistent with different industry
configurations involving a multiplicity of size-distributions of
firms.
The dissertation reaches several important conclusions.
Firms in a competitive-oligopoly will, in general, produce the
output associated with minimum efficient scale. Rental income
correctly, reflects the opportunity cost for entrepreneurial
Vservices, including, most importantly, entrepreneurial
uncertainty. Finally, firms need not be the same size in a zero
pure-profit equilibrium.
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CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF RENT
Frank Knight has argued that rents arise under perfect
competition, being attributable to differentials in the level of
risks faced by firms. He argues further that no such rents may
be imputed for uncertainty. Uncertainty results in the existence
of a non-imputable pure profit [18, 308]. Knight views a long-
run, competitive equilibrium which is characterized by a tendency
towards the dissipation of such profits.
Greenhut [13] has extended Knight's analysis to describe
long-run equilibrium in spatial [oligopolistic] markets. He
argues that the uncertainty associated with such markets will
yield long-run economic profits.
An adequate appraisal of a long-run equilibrium within the
spatial context is necessarily keyed to a clear concept of the
term rent! What are the sources of rent? Under what conditions
may rent be expected to persist? How does the analysis of rent
fit within neoclassical economic analysis?
The dissertation will follow the format of the
Southern Economic Journal. The specific article used as a
model is by Lloyd R. Cohen, "The Firm: A Revised
Definition", Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 46, October
1979, 580-590.
This chapter traces the historical development of the theory
of rent. In a later chapter, this concept is applied to the
spatial firm.
Pre-Ricardian Rent Theory
Keiper [17, 4] attributes the origin of the theory of land
rent to the mercantilist economists of the late seventeenth
century. By land rent they meant the payment to an owner of a
scarce resource which is in relatively fixed supply. Sir William
Petty appears to be the first major writer to analyse rent in his
1662 book, A Treatise on Taxes and Contributions. This tract is
important for several reasons: it is the first to identify rent
as a residual; it implies that the magnitude of rent depends upon
market forces; it associates rent with a concept of opportunity
cost; and, it attributes rent to variations in fertility and
production techniques [24]. Petty did not explicitly associate
rent with a fixed supply of land. Nor did he address the
question of returns to scale which was later to be taken up by
Ricardo. Charles Hull, Petty's modern editor, asserts that Petty
probably thought the fertility of land could be infinitely
increased with proper cultivation [24].
The physiocrats attributed all surplus, the product net, to
the farming sector. Turgot, however, contributed to the theory
of rent in several ways.
Turgot refers to land rent as a surplus rather than as a
residuum [37]. He was the first major economist to assert that
the surplus must be imputed as a cost of production. Rent merely
reflects the opportunity cost of the capital invested in
agricultural production. Turgot argues that when market prices
are so low as to yield the cultivator insufficient returns to
cover this opportunity cost, farmers will not wish to work the
land. It is apparent that Turgot is using the term rent in the
macroeconomic context as the factor payment to land resources.
He is not referring to rents due to differentials in skills,
fertility, or fixity of resources.
Adam Smith is the last of the significant pre-Ricardians to
contribute to the theory of rent. Smith's analysis generated
great debate concerning the nature of rent. His major point of
departure was his view that land rent was a monopoly rent [32].
A monopoly rent, as used herein, refers to a return in excess of
a factor's opportunity cost. A careful reading of his Wealth of
Nations indicates that Smith was not rejecting the concept of
land rent, but was augmenting it with another type of rent.
Smith's analysis generated much discussion pertaining to the
question of whether rent is price-determining or price
determined. Smith himself seemed unclear as to which was the
case. Smith states:
In the price of corn, for example, one part pays
the rent of the landlord, another pays the wages
or maintenance of the labourers and labouring
cattle employed in producing it, and the third
pays the profit of the farmer. These three parts
seem either immediately or ultimately to make up
the whole price of corn [32, 50].
Yet in Chapter XI, "Of the Rent of Land," Smith states,
"High or low wages and profit are the causes of high or low
price, high, or low rent is the effect of it", [32, 146].
Buchanan has argued that there is no conflict in Smith's
view of rent. He suggests that the former passage was written
with respect to income distribution, while the latter was written
with respect to price determination. According to Buchanan [6,
599-637], there is no causal attribution to be inferred from the
first citation.
Smith suggested that rent also varies with the locational
advantages of the ground-site [32, 147]. While he recognized
that rent reflected opportunity costs of capital as well as
fertility differentials, these observations cannot be considered
new or expansive.
The pre-Ricardian period provided an embryonic theory of
rent. Petty identified the concept of land rent, rent as an
opportunity cost, differential rent, and the qualification of
rent as a residual. Turgot defined land rent as a surplus which
must be expensed. He also refined Petty's concept of opportunity
cost and extended it so that land rent must cover the opportunity
cost of investing in other capital projects. Smith viewed a
second type of rent, one which yields an unearned surplus to be
expropriated by the monopolist. He further recognized that
locational advantages were reflected in the rents paid to
different tracts.
The Ricardian Period
The theory of rent popularized by David Ricardo has been
attributed by some historians to James Anderson or Thomas Malthus
[27]. Regardless of its originality, the wide dissemination of
the theory is attributable to the success of Ricardo's Principles
of Political Economy and Taxation [25].
Ricardo incorporated his views into a broad theory of
distribution. Gootzeit [12, 41-53] and Spiegel [33, 326] both
provide excellent tabular illustrations of Ricardo's distributive
mechanism. Ricardo viewed the price of a good as covering the
cost of production associated with land at the extensive margin
of cultivation. Inframarginal lands therefore received surpluses
which reflected their greater productivity. Increasing demand
for agricultural products would necessitate the employment of
more marginal land in the long run. Thus rents paid to landlords
would thereby increase.
Long-run competitive conditions fail to bid away rents since
they are not viewed as scarcity rents. Ricardo's rents are most
appropriately viewed as differential rents. These rents are
attributable to the heterogeneous productivity of land. The
acknowledgment of the persistence of rents in the long run was
Ricardo's major lasting contributions to rent theory.
Francis Amasa Walker [38] was the American apologist for
David Ricardo. As such, his views on rent do not significantly
differ from those of Ricardo. However, two passages from Land
and Its Rents are noteworthy.
In the first, Walker uses the term "law of diminishing
returns" in reference to Ricardo's theory [38, 20]. Secondly,
Walker seems to have anticipated Wicksteed's product exhaustion
theorem. Walker states:
Rent arises from the fact of varying
degrees of productiveness in the lands
actually contributing to the supply of the
same market, the least productive land
paying no rent, or a rent so small that it
may be treated as none. The rent of all
the higher grades of land is measured upwards
from this line, the rent of each piece
absorbing all the excess produce above
that of the no-rent land [38, 21].
This passage is very similar to Wicksteed's verbal
expression of the product exhaustion theorem: Under ordinary
conditions of competitive industry, it is sensibly or
approximately true that if every factor of production draws
remuneration determined by its marginal efficiency or
significance, the whole of the product will be exactly
distributed", [41, 38].^
1. It should be noted that Wicksteed disapproved of the
manner in which the term "rent" is commonly used by
economists.
Ricardo's and Walker's views of rent were based upon a
production function characterized by diminishing returns. By
diminishing returns, Ricardo means diminishing average and total
products on marginal units of land.
Karl Marx chastised Ricardo for basing his analysis upon the
marginal principle [22, 772], Marx indicates that the mere
existence of differentials in productivity suffice for the
existence of land rents. Marx was explicit concerning the
relationship between opportunity costs and rents. He extended an
example originated by Adam Smith concerning the use of land to
raise cattle. Marx notes that such land must provide the same
rental as if the land were used for growing cereal [22, 891-892].
Nassau Senior [31] also attacked the Ricardian view that
rent arises solely from differentials in the yields of land.
Senior viewed part of the return from investing in agricultural
production as a return on capital. He was also explicit about
the ascription of differential rents to all factors of
production. Senior reacted strongly against the use of the term
"rent" as an income generated by many different processes. The
term had come to be used in several different ways by the height
of the Ricardian era. Some economists were using the term as
describing the total factor payments to land resources. Other
economists were using the term to describe differential returns
due to differences in productivity. While the term is still used
in both ways, it is usually clear to modern economists which
definition is appropriate.
Like Walker, John Stuart Mill must be viewed as an apologist
for Ricardo's view of rent. His views mirror Ricardo's
preoccupation with the law of diminishing returns [23, 690].
Mill did depart from Ricardo's analysis in that he
recognized that scarcity rents are indeed a short-run cost of
production:
Rent is not an element of the cost of production
of the commodity which yields it; except in the
cases (rather conceivable than actually existing)
in which it results from, and represents, a
scarcity value. But when land capable of yielding
rent in agriculture is applied to some other purpose,
the rent which it would have yielded is an element
of the cost of production of the commodity which it
is employed to produce [23, 479].
The Ricardian period was characterized by a great deal of
confusion concerning the origin and nature of rent. There was no
logical organization of rent concepts into a cohesive body of
theory. During this period, however, most of the basic tenets of
modern rent theory were established.
The German Theorists
During the Ricardian period, German theorists made
significant contributions to the theory of rent. However, it
appears that there was little interchange of ideas between
English and German economists at this time.
As early as 1800, German theorists were ascribing rents to
differentials in the skills of workers. This is notable given
the myopic preoccupation of English economists with the rent of
land. John George Bush notes that:
... in store the more skillful packer is paid
better than the unskilled... if it was worth
the trouble to be very exact in the matter, one
could even contest whether wages-gain
(Arbeiterslohn-Gewinn) is rightly so characterized,
for it can, at least in part, be regarded as a
rent of the mere skill of the labor, for though
the rent is so insignificant, yet the incapable
labourers cannot draw it [7,107-108].
Gottlieb Hufeland made several significant contributions to
the theory of rent. Hufeland used the term rent to refer to
productivity differentials rather than to the factor payment for
land. Hufeland classified all rent as being of four types: the
rent of land, the rent of capital, the rent of labor, and the
rent of the Unternehmer (entrepreneur). It is the rent of the
Unternehmer to which Hufeland devotes the most attention.
Hufeland is one of the first economists to clearly distinguish
between the entrepreneur and the capitalist. He states,"He who
employs the capital is the Unternehmer, the owner of the capital
is the capitalist, and the return which the Unternehmer receive
is called the 'Unternehmungsgewinn", [16, 109]. Hufeland
considers the unternehmungsgewinn as a surplus after abstracting
wages with gain, repair of capital, repair for the risk of
capital, and capitalgewinn (interest). This is the first clear
reference to a return for the risk of capital. Hufeland views
this repair for risk of capital as a cost of production which
must be paid to the capitalist. However, he also recognizes the
risk of the Unternehmer.
The balance comes to the Unternehmer, and is
partly a gain which he draws because of the
greater risk which he incurrs, and partly for
a rent for his talent or other mental qualities.
And so it is in the class of successful
Unternehmers that the greatest wealth is gained.
The rent for the talent and other qualities
has no limit because men of this sort are scarce
[16, 110].
The Unternehmungsgewinn is in part a return for
entrepreneurial risk. Mangoldt later emphasized that the
Unternehmer's rent does not cause an increase in the price of
products [20]. The return for entrepreneurial risk is not
considered to be a cost of production.
Charles William Macfarlane was an American who studied at
Freiburg University. Macfarlane was in closer contact with his
English contemporaries than his predecessors had been. This is
evidenced by his diagrammatic presentation of a marginal
productivity theory of rent. This presentation is almost
indistinguishable from that of Alfred Marshall [20, 86].
Macfarlane did make one notable contribution to the theory
of rent. He expanded upon Ricardo's ascription of a rental due
to the producer's distance from the market [20, 87].
The German theorists were much more explicit in their
analysis than most of their English contemporaries. They
recognized rental payments for skill differentials,
entrepreneurial talent, entrepreneurial risk, capital, and
distance from the market.
The Post Ricardian Period
Phillip Wicksteed strongly objected to the Ricardian view of
rent as differentials in the productivity of hired factors [40,
22] .
Ricardo had been interpreted as having defined rent as the
shaded area in figure 1.1. This is a somewhat gratuitous
interpretation, as Ricardo's tabular example is based upon
diminishing average product and a total product which, after a
point, increases at a decreasing rate.
Wicksteed's criticism is based upon the reflexive nature of
the product curves for land and labor. In figure 1.1, at OL
units of labor and with fixed quantity of land, labor's earnings
are given by LMNO. The factor payment to land is given by the
shaded area. Analogously, one may view a similar figure for the
marginal product of land with labor held constant. The shaded
area in figure 1.1 is not a surplus but the factor payment to
land. Wicksteed was considering production processes
characterized by Euler's equation. There can be no surplus when
production is linearly homogeneous and each factor is paid its
marginal product. In Wicksteed's view, all factor payments may
be viewed as rents under the Ricardian theory.
Alfred Marshall adopted a qualified version of Ricardo's
theory. Like the German theorists he viewed the rent of land as
"not a thing in itself, but as the leading species of a large
genus", [21, 412],
Marshall held that rents may be viewed as either scarcity
rents or differential rents. The choice is a matter of
expository convenience [21, 442-443]. In his example of a shower
of meteoric stones, he analyzed the rental payment from both
points of view.
Marshall also distinguished between quasi-rents and rents.
Quasi-rents were viewed as returns in excess of variable costs.
As such, they are short-run in nature [21, 424]. In the long
run, the confident expectation of coming quasi-rents yields a
normal rate of profit on free capital. These opportunity profits
are discounted to determine the value of a piece of capital
equipment. Marshall views this value as the factor payment
(rent) to capital.
Henderson analyzed the factor payment of land which was
subject to a number of alternative uses. He formulated the
concept of the "margin of transference." Land is said to be at
its margin of transference when its rent is just sufficient to
prevent its tranference to some alternative use [15, 94-97].
Joan Robinson utilized Henderson's margin of transference as
the basis of her concept of rent. She notes that, "The essence
of the conception of rent is the conception of a surplus earned
by a particular factor of production over and above the minimum
earnings necessary to induce it to do its work", [26, 102].
Robinson attempted to salvage Ricardian rent theory.
However, her treatment is concerned with marginal costs and not
average product as was Ricardo's. She defined "intensive
marginal cost as: "...the cost of making a unit increase in the
output produced with the aid of any given portion of the scarce
factor by increasing the amount of the other factors", [26, 122].
Intensive marginal cost for each factor will equal the price of
the commodity. This is true whether or not a factor is in
perfectly elastic supply. If the price of a commodity exceeded
intensive marginal cost, it would be profitable to expand output
until intensive marginal cost rose to equal price. This would be
accomplished by using the scarce factor more intensively.
As demand for a commodity increases, more of all factors of
production will be employed. The price of the marginal units of
factors will increase. The price of all units of a factor will
equal the price of the marginal unit. A profit maximizing firm
will increase the employment of those factors whose prices do not
rise as much relative to the scarce factor. The scarce factor
(with less elastic supply) will be used more intensively as
output increases, subject to the technical possibilities of
substitution. The intensive marginal cost and the cost at the
margin will both rise and remain equal to commodity price.
Robinson states:
In every case the supply price of the
commodity is equal to cost at the margin
and to intensive marginal cost. Rent makes
up the difference between the price and the
cost of producing a unit of the commodity with
the aid of inframarginal units of the factors,
and supply price is equal to average cost in¬
cluding rent [26, 126].
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Robinson graphically illustrated the case where
entrepreneurship was the scarce factor, and all other factors
were in perfectly elastic supply.
Figure 1.2 is reproduced from Robinson's figures 41 and 42
[26, 125]. In figure 1.2, AC is the average cost of the output
of the firm (excluding rent) for each firm. Likewise, MC is the
marginal cost of each firm. AC' is the average cost of the firm
including the entrepreneur's rent. ADCB is the total rent of the
entrepreneur, Robinson ascribes rent as a lump sum to the total
costs of the inframarginal firm. This ascription does not shift
Intraraarginal Firm
Figure 1.2. Robinson's View of Rent
the marginal cost curve, which will cut both AC and AC' at their
minimum points.
It is important to note that the AC and MC curves are not
the same for the inframarginal firm and the marginal firm. The
cost at the margin is the marginal cost of the firm on the border
of transference, or the marginal firm in figure 1.2. Intensive
marginal cost is the marginal cost of the inframarginal firm.
The cost at the margin of the commodity is equal to the cost of
the firm using only marginal units of all factors. Infra¬
marginal firms, however, work the scarce factor more intensively.
Their costs will be less than those of the marginal firm.
There are several problems with Robinson's analysis.
Robinson has defined rent as the surplus earned by a factor in
excess of the minimum earnings necessary to induce it to do its
work [26, 102]. Elsewhere Robinson defines rent as the
difference between total revenue and total cost of the
inframarginal firm [26, 124]. These definitions are not
consistent. The expansion of production drives up the market
price of all units of the scarce factor. The total, average, and
marginal cost curves of the marginal and inframarginal firm will
be the same. If the new, higher price for entrepreneurial
services is not paid to the inframarginal firm, his services will
be bid away.
Robinson also assumes that the scarce factor may be worked
more intensively by the inframarginal firm at no increase in
expense. It is hardly conceivable that increases in the intensity
of factor utilization do not entail higher factor payments. Even
in the case of land or capital, more intensive utilization is not
likely to be costless. It will result in an accelerated
depreciation of the factor's productive life and efficiency. The
level of intensity will normally be proportional to the level of
output. It therefore seems logical that rent should be ascribed
as a variable cost rather than a fixed cost.
Finally, as these costs are actually incurred, rents should
not be viewed as a surplus. Chamberlin is explicit in this
regard:
The curve for the inframarginal producers will
evidently have the same minimum point, if their
rents are included as costs, and they must be so
included. Although rents may be surpluses from
certain points of view, or for certain purposes,
or subject to certain interpretations, they are
to the individual producer no different from any
other money expense. They do not arise as a
surplus from his own operations; they are a cost
rigidly imposed upon him by the competition of
his rivals for the use of rent yielding property.
They figure in the same way as do the wages of
labor and the interest of capital in his computa¬
tions as to the most advantageous proportion bet¬
ween the factors and as to the most advantageous
scale of operations [8, 22].
In Robinson's terminology, increases in output bid up the
price of factor units at the margin of transference. In
competitive factor markets, the minimum amounts of earnings
necessary to induce a factor to do its work is bid up to the same
level. There will remain no surplus, and therefore no rent.
Robinson's analysis is a theory of marginal wage
determination rather than a theory of rent. It is, however, of
monumental significance in the development of rent theory. Fritz
Machlup provided the appropriate extension of Robinson's work
into a true theory of rent.
Machlup recognized that an excess of total receipts over
total costs could persist in the long run under certain
conditions. He identifies these conditions as factor immobility,
uncertainty, and indivisibility in the production process. He
categorizes the anticipated excess of receipts over all costs as
either specific rent or pure profit [19, 243].
Specific rent is that portion of net-earnings which can be
imputed to a specific resource whose value to the firm is in
excess of its opportunity cost. The portion of net earnings
which cannot be imputed to any resource is known as pure profit.
Factor immobility is a source of specific rent. Uncertainty and
indivisibility of the production process are sources of pure
profit [19, 237-238].
Machlup's definitions imply that returns for uncertainty or
indivisibility cannot be imputed to any of the cost curves.
Indeed, he does not attempt any type of imputational process for
pure profit. He does, however, specify an imputational procedure
for the specific rents created by natural or artificial scarcity
(immobility).
Machlup considers the case of an increase in product price
occasioned by an increase in demand. In figure 1.3 the firm has
been a marginal producer. The initial price, OA, has been equal
to average cost, KQ, and the firm has been earning no economic
rent. Assume that the firm now faces price OB due to the
increase in market demand. The firm will now maximize profits by
producing where price equals marginal cost, or OM units of
output.
At OM units of output average revenue, MP, exceeds average
cost exclusive of rents, MR, by RP. RP is the firm's average
rent. If this rent is included in the average cost curve,
average revenue must be equal to average cost. Machlup states:
"If the new average cost curve including rent is drawn (by
spreading the total rent over the output and adding it to the
average cost with-out rent), this curve, AC2* must of necessity
have its lowest point in P and thus be tangent to the new demand
curve", [19, 289].
Machlup provides no justification for this imputational
procedure nor elaborates further upon it. Note that Machlup
makes no attempt to distinguish between an exclusive and
inclusive marginal cost curve. The imputational procedure is
implicitly one of ascribing rent as either a fixed cost or as a
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Figure 1.3. Machlupfs View of Rent
quantity
constant variable cost. In either case, the marginal cost curve
will be unaffected.
Machlup categorizes rents and profits as the anticipated
excess of receipts over all costs. The italicized term is used
to distinguish between historical or incurred cost, and
anticipated or opportunity cost. He emphasizes that economic
cost curves fully reflect opportunity costs.
Machlup recognizes that rents arise only because of factor
immobility. With factor immobility no equilibrating mechanism
exists which will bid up the price of inframarginal units to that
of the marginal unit. Commodity price will exceed average cost.
In Robinson's example, the entrepreneur will continue to receive
income in excess of the minimum necessary to induce it to do its
work. Under conditions of perfect mobility of resources rents
will dissipate.
Uncertainty or indivisibility in the production process
implies the reaping of pure economic profits. Machlup does not
specify a process which would lead to the dissipation of such
profits in a competitive, long-run equilibrium. Economic
activity in a spatial context is primarily differentiated from
that of a spaceless economy by the persistence of uncertainty nd
indivisibility. The existence of long run profits is
characteristic of a spatial firm.
Machlup's analysis of rent is widely accepted by micro-
economists. His views on pure profit (attributable to
indivisibility and uncertainty) have not been as widely accepted.
Machlup did not develop this theme as vigorously as his theory of
rent. His theory also does not adequately address the question
of whether firms face different cost curves. Nor does Machlup
explore a variable cost ascription of rent. These areas are
developed in detail in the next chapter.
The post-Ricardian period must be primarily characterized as
an era in which economists sought to refine Ricardo's theory to
the exclusion of contributions made by previous writers. Since
the primary thrust of Ricardo's Principles is the theory of
distribution, it is only natural that Wicksteed should explore
this aspect of rent. Alfred Marshall, more than any other
economist of his era, recognized that heterogeneous factors of
production other than land may earn rental income. Joan Robinson
appears to be the first economist to suggest a fixed-cost
ascription for rental income. She unfortunately dwells upon
Ricardo's view of rent as a surplus. Fritz Machlup also proposes
a fixed-cost imputation procedure. While his approach is little
differentiated from Robinson's, he at least recognizes the
possibility that rental income may persist in the long run.
Summary
This chapter briefly summarized the major contributions to
the theory of rent from the time of the mercantilist economists
to the neoclassical era. The mercantilists dwelt upon the nature
of rent as it applies to land resources.
Classical economists extended the concept of rent to apply
to differential ground-sites as well as differential
productivities. Contemporaneously, Karl Marx recognized that the
rent of land must be viewed as reflecting the full opportunity
cost of the resource.
The German theorists extended the concept of rent to apply
to all factors of production. They focused primarly upon the
rent of the entrepreneur.
Neoclassical economists were the first to propose specific
imputational procedures to reflect rental income. Both Robinson
and Machlup appeared preoccupied with Ricardian analysis. They
tended to view rent as a residual rather than as an opportunity
cost. Machlup argued that rents may persist in the long run.
Marshall and Knight both emphasized the emergence of rentals for
factors of production other than land.
CHAPTER II
EXTENDING THE THEORIES
The analyses of rent by Marshall, Robinson, and Machlup form
the nucleus of present-day rent theory. Their work, however,
left unanswered several questions concerning the nature of rents.
These questions concern the socially optimal scale of output for
inframarginal firms, the conditions which allow rental earnings
to evolve, and the appropriate ascription procedures for imputing
rents. These questions have been addressed by several modern
exponents of the theory of rent.
The Optimal Scale of Output
Schumpeter [29] cites Ricardo as making the observation
which is well-known to the "man in the street": there are low
cost firms and high cost firms. This is a theme expanded upon by
Blodgett, who states,
In the long run, the size, productive capacity,
and output of a competitive industry will tend
to be such that the equilibrium price will be
equal to the long-run minimum average cost of
all the firms in the industry, when each firm
is at the optimum size on the basis of the partic¬
ular agents of production at its disposal [italics
mine] so that all firms will have the same long-
run minimum average cost of production [5, 285].
The existence of different sized firms in long-run
competitive equilibrium is often obscured by the recently modern
convention of focusing upon the representative firm.
The concept of a representative firm is often credited to
Alfred Marshall. Schumpeter refers to this inappropriate
citation as a "methodological fiction [29, 1045], Blaugh refers
to Marshall's representative firm as an abstraction. It was not
perceived by Marshall as an arithmetic average, median, or a
modal firm. It is representative only with respect to the
minimum average cost of production, and not with respect to size
[4, 374].
Schumpeter credits Pigou with introducing the concept of an
"equilibrium firm." Pigou's equilibrium firm represents the
modal conditions within an industry. Pigou did not suggest that
all firms are identical to the modal firm [29, 1045].
The location of the cost curves of the marginal and
inframarginal firms appears to have been the source of some
confusion with respect to the imputation of rents. Machlup's
procedure seems to imply that the inclusive average cost curve
will coincide with the marginal firm's average cost curve.
Robinson, however, depicts different sets of cost curves for the
marginal firm and the inframarginal firm after the ascription of
rents.
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Ferguson provides a lucid description of the effect of entry
in an increasing cost industry [9, 279]. When this analysis is
combined with his analysis of rents [9, 411], a clear picture of
the cost curves of the two firms emerges. Ferguson initially
assumes an industry in long-run competitive equilibrium.
The firm represented by SAC^ and LAC^ in figure 2.1 need not be
considered a representative firm. The cost curves SAC^ and lAQ^
more appropriately represent those of the high-cost producer.
Assume that all factors are in perfectly elastic supply to
the industry with the exception of capital. An increase in
Figure 2.1. The Inframarginal and Marginal Firms in
Competitive Equilibrium
market demand for the industry's product will increase the value
of marginal product of capital. The price of capital will be bid
upwards.
Stigler provides two reasons for the rise in price of a
factor in inelastic supply. First, additional units may be ill-
suited for employment. Their cost to the industry rises in terms
or productivity. Second, as other industries lose capital and
restrict output, the remaining quantities of capital become more
valuable because of their higher marginal products. Their
products will therefore command higher prices. Resource prices
will be bid upwards and the value of the marginal product of
capital will rise.
Stigler asserts that the marginal firm's marginal cost curve
will lie to the left of the inframarginal firm's marginal cost
curve [34, 164]. Indeed, in the long run the inframarginal
firm's cost curves will coincide with those of the marginal firm.
This is because in the long run the inframarginal firm's capital
must be replaced at the new higher price of capital.
Ferguson also indicates that a leftward shift of marginal
cost curves will ensue. In his analysis, the existence of more
firms insures that the industry supply shifts to the right, so
that more output is produced [9, 279].
Figure 2.1 illustrates the cost curves of the inframarginal
(subscript 1) and marginal (subscript 2) firms, q must be less
28
than q^. The level of output associated with minimum average
cost is different for the two firms. Manifestly, if the rents
are attributable to differences in the quality of resources there
is no reason why the cost curves of the two firms should coincide
in the long-run.
Ferguson depicts the inframarginal firm's rents as shown in
figure 2.2. Quasi rents are given by the difference between
short-run total revenue and total variable cost. This quantity
is given by the area of the rectangle P'ACD. Quasi rents may be
divided into pure economic profit and opportunity cost
The Rent of the Inframarginal FirmFigure 2.2.
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components.
Pure economic profits are attributable to the employment of
the scarce resource in this industry rather than in their best
alternative use. These profits are represented by the area
P'ABE. The opportunity cost of the scarce resource is given by
fixed costs. These costs are represented by the difference
between total costs and total variable costs. These costs are
given by the area EBCD in figure 2.2.
This particular ascription of opportunity costs has its
foundation in Marshall and its embellishment in Stigler [35, 250-
253]. Marshall explicitly considers the scarce factor to be
capital. The difference between average total cost and average
variable cost times the level of output represents interest plus
depreciation on capital. If total quasi rents exceed this
amount, more of the scarce factor will be produced and employed.
If quasi rents fall short of these fixed charges, the factor will
be depreciated off the books and not replaced. The firm will
exit the industry in its given form. As Stigler notes, the
return to the factor must equal the current market rate of return
including an allowance for risk. Quasi rents may fail to return
the original cost plus interest over the factor's entire life.
The failure to do so reflects expectational errors with respect
to the value of the quasi rents over the life of the machine. It
is the quest for quasi rents which induces entry into an
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industry. The failure of these rents to cover the opportunity
cost of capital will lead to exit from the industry.
While Ferguson's and Stigler's analyses suggests the role of
quasi rents as a guiding mechanism, they do not explicitly
provide appropriate imputational procedures.
The Conditions Giving Rise to Rents
Ferguson's analysis implicitly assumes that an upward
sloping industry supply curve is necessary for the existence of
rents. Blaugh notes that this is a necessary but not sufficient
condition. The supply curve may be upward sloping due to the
existence of either pecuniary or real diseconomies of scale [4,
368].
External diseconomies are pecuniary when they reflect an
increase in factor price due to an increase in factor demand.
Inframarginal firms are viewed as possessing stocks of the scarce
factor purchased at the previous price. When the opportunity
costs of these stocks are explicitly recognized, the total cost
of production will increase by an amount equal to the increase in
the value of the stock. Since the total cost of producing all
levels of output rise by a constant amount, the short-run
marginal cost curve of the firm does not shift in the presence of
such scarcity rents. Such diseconomies appear to imply the
propriety of fixed cost imputations.
Real external diseconomies occur when entry changes the
technological milieu in which firms operate. Blaugh cites a
publicly owned road or a common oil field as classical examples.
He views such factors of production as "implicit" or "hidden"
inputs. While these inputs are free to the firm, they are
nevertheless scarce. An increase in the utilization of such
resources shifts the short-run supply curve of every firm to the
left, according to Blaugh. Real external diseconomies do not
create rent! This is because the increased costs are actually
incurred by all firms within the industry.
The cost curves of the inframarginal firm for an industry
subject to pecuniary external diseconomies is illustrated in
figure 2.3.
Assume that all inputs but one scarce factor are in
infinitely elastic supply. Only the price of the scarce factor
will be allowed to rise. Further assume that there are n firms
in a competitive industry. The short-run marginal cost curve of
one firm with its accompanying envelope curve is illustrated on
the left. The long-run industry supply curve is illustrated on
the right. While the relevant short-run industry supply curves
are omitted by Blaugh, they are understood to pass through the
points (Q^, P^) and (Q , respectively. Blaugh asserts that
the short-run marginal cost curve of the firm does not change
when scarcity rents emerge. This is because the total cost of
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Figure 2.3. Pecuniary External Diseconomies and
Competitive Equilibrium
producing all levels of output rises by a constant amount.
Blaugh is implicitly assuming a fixed cost imputation.
Consider an increase in market demand from to D^. The
equilibrium price will increase from Pj to P^. The firm sets the
new price equal to short-run marginal cost, increasing production
from q^ to q^. In Blaugh*s example, the rent adjusted SAC curve
is just tangent to the average revenue curve given by P^. Since
potential entrants view entry as profitless, entry does not
occur. The number of firms does not change in Blaugh's example.
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Since the SMC curve and the number of firms do not change,
neither does short-run industry supply. Blaugh's long-run supply
curve therefore coincides with short-run industry supply.
There are two troublesome aspects of Blaugh's analysis of
pecuniary external diseconomies. First, Blaugh implicitly
assumes that SAC2 in figure 2.3 represents the relevant SAC curve
of the marginal firm. It does not. SAC2 is the representation
of the rent-adjusted SAC curve of the inframarginal firm. These
two curves do not coincide in general. Ferguson and Saving have
shown that the shift in the entire set of cost curves depends
upon the expenditure elasticity of the scarce factor [11]. Their
results are presented in the second appendix to this chapter.
They show that the output associated with minimum long-run
average cost will decrease if the scarce factor is superior. In
Blaugh's example, the scarce factor must be either a normal or
inferior input. More importantly, the minimum level of long-run
average cost may be either greater than or less than the new
market price. If P2 exceeds minimum long-run average cost for
the marginal firm, entry will occur. If P2 is less than minimum
LAC, exit of inframarginal firms will occur. This is so because
when the stocks of the scarce resource are depleted, they must be
replaced at the higher price in the long run. In any event, it
is unlikely that the number of firms remain constant. A more
detailed analysis of pecuniary diseconomies is presented later in
this chapter.
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Figure 2.4 is representative of industries characterized by
real external diseconomies. As industry output expands and the
supply price of the industry as a whole increases, the supply
curve of each firm shifts to the left. Blaugh associates real
economies or diseconomies with variations in the number of firms.
In the case of real diseconomies, the increase in industry supply
is attributable to the entry of new firms.
The higher cost curves illustrated in figure 2.4 are
actually incurred by existing firms. Rentals, therefore, do not
emerge. The higher cost curves illustrated in figure 2.3
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represent ascriptions of opportunity costs to existing firms.
Since these costs are not actually incurred, rentals are earned
within the industry.
Figure 2.4 is drawn such that the optimal level of output of
each firm does not change; this will never be the case. The
third appendix to this chapter demonstrates that the level of
output associated with minimum average cost must always decrease
where real external diseconomies prevail.
As indicated above, Blaugh's analysis of pecuniary
diseconomies constitutes a special case. Figure 2.3 assumes that
the scarce factor is a normal or inferior input. It further
assumes that the rent-adjusted cost curves for the inframarginal
firm coincide with the cost curves of the marginal firm. The
analysis of real external diseconomies is incorrect since it can
be demonstrated that the level of output associated with minimum
long-run average cost must always decrease. Since such
diseconomies do not create rent, however, further analysis of
this case is relegated to the appendix.
Consider the situation in which all factors of production
are in infinitely elastic supply except for capital. Let an
increase in market demand occur so that the equilibrium price
increases. Entry will occur if new firms view entry as
profitable under the new set of factor prices, where only the
price of capital has increased. Since relative factor prices
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have changed, the equation of the expansion path changes,
defining a new set of long-run cost curves.
If the new market price exceeds the new minimum level of
average cost, entry will occur. As entry proceeds, the price of
capital is bid upwards and the long-run average cost curve keeps
shifting upwards. Simultaneously, entry causes a rightward shift
of short-run industry supply. These forces cause the long-run
average cost curve of the marginal firm to rise while the market
price continues to fall. Entry ceases and equilibrium is
established when price is just equal to minimum long-run average
cost. Such an equilibrium is illustrated in figure 2.5. In this
figure, the cost curves of the marginal firm in equilibrium are
represented by LAC^ and LMC^. The cost curves of an
inframarginal firm are represented by SAC^ and SMC^. The rent-
adjusted SAC curve is SAC^. Figure 2.5 employs a fixed cost
imputation of the type suggested by Robinson, Machlup, and
Blaugh. If the cost advantage of the inframarginal firm
dissipates in the long run, the relevant LAC curve for the firm
will be determined by the then current prices of capital and
other resources. As capital is depreciated it must be replaced
at current market prices. If the inframarginal firm's capital is
relatively long-lived, rentals may persist for extended periods
of time. Indeed, if the price of capital rises continuously over
time, inframarginal firms will always earn rentals.
0qj2mQjq2
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As indicated in figure 2.5, the appropriate imputation for
rents need not result in a coincidence of cost curves for the
marginal and inframarginal firms. The optimal level of output
varies for the marginal and inframarginal firms.
Imputation Procedures
Machlup suggested a fixed cost imputational procedure. This
procedure is based upon the ascription of the value of the
opportunity cost of resources as a lump sum. As such, the
imputation will have no effect upon the marginal cost curve of
the firm. In figure 2.5, the rent-adjusted SAC curve will slide
up SMC^ until minimum adjusted average cost is equal to minimum
SAC^* This result is easily demonstrated.
Assume a situation in which entry of the marginal firm is
associated with pecuniary external diseconomies. The unadjusted
cost curves are given by SAC^ and SMC^ in figure 2.6. The cost
curves for the marginal firm are given by SAC£ and SMC^. The
adjusted cost curves for the inframarginal firm will be given by
SAC^ and SMC^ under a lump sum imputation.
Figure 2.6 assumes the scarce factor is superior since the
level of output associated with minimum long-run average cost
decreases as the factor price increases. The marginal firm pays
Rm per unit of the scarce factor. The inframarginal firm has
only paid R. (<R ) per unit of the scarce factor. The task at
1 m
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Figure 2.6. Fixed Cost imputations for Rent and
Short-Run Competitive Equilibrium
hand is to ascribe the full opportunity cost of the inframarginal
firm's scarce factor to SMC^ and SAC^.
In neoclassical rent theory the scarce factor is assumed to
be fixed for the inframarginal firm to the extent that it is
immobile and the cost of the factor represents a sunk cost. If
the scarce factor was mobile, the firm must pay the higher market
price for it to prevent the migration of the factor to firms
willing to bid more for it. If the factor costs are not sunk
costs, the inframarginal firm must hire it at its current market
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price. Thus no rentals would be earned. It seems plausible to
therefore impute the full opportunity cost as a fixed cost. The
ascription must be accomplished such that the full opportunity
cost is reflected at the actual level of output produced by the
firm. This level of output is given by q^* in figure 2.6.
Mathematically, let the unadjusted cost curves of the
inframarginal firm be obtained by:
2.1) c(q) = v(q) + f
2.2) c(q)/q = [v(q) + f]/q
2.3) c'(q) = v'(q)
where c(q) represents total cost, v(q) represents variable cost,
and f represents fixed cost. Further, let the lump sum rental be
given by:
2.4) r = (R - R.) • S.
f m l l
[where R^ and R.^ are as previously defined], and represents
the quantity of the fixed scarce factor used by the inframarginal
firm. With the ascription of the full opportunity cost of these
resources, the inframarginal firm's cost curves are given by:
2.5) c(q) = v(q) + f + r^
2.6) c(q)/q = [v(q) +f]/q + rf/q
2.7) c'(q) = v'(q)
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This type of imputational procedure results in a divergence
between the inclusive and exclusive average cost curves.
Equations 2.3 and 2.7 indicate that marginal cost is stationary
under fixed-cost ascriptions. Note that the rental determined by
equation 2.4 is determined by the difference in prices paid for
the scarce factor and the absolute quantity of the scarce factor
utilized by the inframarginal firm. Equation 2.4 indicates that
the opportunity cost to be imputed is independent of the level of
output. Such an assumption may not be warranted for all types of
resources. For the moment, abstractly consider the situation in
which the opportunity cost is dependent upon the rate of
utilization of the scarce factor. Further assume that as output
increases, the rate of utilization of the scarce factor
increases. By way of example, let the opportunity cost (required
rental) be given by r(q) such that
2.8) r(q) = a + b * q.
Inclusive total cost will exceed exclusive total cost by a + b
q. Inclusive average cost will exceed exclusive average cost by
a/q + b. When q is zero, inclusive average cost explodes to
infinity. As q increases, the difference between the curves
converges to b.
Inclusive marginal cost will exceed exclusive marginal cost
by precisely b at every level of output. These curves are
illustrated in figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7. Variable Cost Imputations for Rent
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Note that the quantity associated with minimum inclusive
average cost lies to the left of minimum exclusive average cost.
Such a shift is not economically appealing. When the firm
entered the industry, it acquired the scarce factor in
anticipation of utilizing it such that the firm's average cost of
production was minimized for every possible level of output.
Furthermore, in the long-run competitive equilibrium, the rate of
utilization of the factor must be consistent with the actual
level of output produced. In the absence of rentals, this level
of output is given by q^ in figure 2.7. If the factor in
question is over-utilized, production costs will rise. Likewise,
when the factor is under-utilized production costs will not be
minimized. When the scarce factor is such that its optimal level
of efficiency occurs at the level of output consistent with
minimum average cost, the factor is said to be conformable [13].^
The class of variable cost imputations for rents must be
restricted so that factor conformability holds. One type of
variable imputation consistent with factor conformability is of
the form:
2.9) r = k • q
v
where k is a constant. This type of imputation is appealing for
reasons other than factor conformability. Assume that the scarce
1. See the appendix to Chapter V.
44
factor is a machine. The machine's economic lifetime may be
considered in terms of the units of output that it is expected to
produce. For example, a welding machine may be expected to
produce only so many sets of table legs during its economic
lifetime.
Assume the machine is expected to produce one hundred units
of output over its lifetime and will only be used to produce ten
units during the current production period. The opportunity cost
to be ascribed is one-tenth of the total cost of the machine. If
the machine is used to produce one hundred units in the current
period, the full cost should be ascribed as a current cost.
Thus, the current period opportunity cost is directly
proportional to the level of current production. Let
2.10) R = [q /q ] • Rn, or equivalently,t t L U
2.11) Rt = [R()/qL] • qt
where R^ is the opportunity cost to be assigned to the current
production period, R^ is the total opportunity cost of the
factor, q is the expected lifetime use of the machine, and q is
i_* t
the level of production in the current period. The level of
opportunity cost to be ascribed during the current period is
function of the factor's total opportunity cost and its rate of
depreciation. This is indicated by equation 2.10. Equation 2.11
indicates that the current allocation of opportunity cost is
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proportional to the level of production. [R^/q^] is the constant
factor of proportionality.
Increases in the opportunity cost of the machine will still
be allocated according to this constant factor of
proportionality. Let the rental to be ascribed due to an
increase in opportunity cost be given by:
2.12) r = R - R. where
vt mt it
2.13) ll
■P [VqL] ' qt» and
2.14) Rit “ [Ri/qL] • qt
where equations 2.13 and 2.14 are derived from equation 2.11, and
the subscripts v, m, i, and t refer to a variable cost imputation
(v) for the marginal firm (m), the inframarginal firm (i), and
the current time period (t). So
2-15) rvt ■ [(Rra - V/<JL] * qt
where the term in parenthesis is a constant factor of
proportionality. Designate this term by k, so that:
2.16) r = k • q,
where the subscript t is dropped for simplicity. The cost curves
apply at a particular time, t.
The inclusive average cost curves of the inframarginal firm
are given by:
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2.17) c(q) = v(q) + f + k • q
2.18) c(q)/q = [v(q) + f]/q + k
2.19) c'(q) = v'(q) + k
By reference to equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, inclusive
marginal and average cost exceed the exclusive counterparts by
the constant, k. Since exclusive marginal and average costs are
equal at minimum average cost, the same will be true of inclusive
marginal and average costs. This type of imputational procedure
is illustrated in figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8. Variable Cost Imputations Under
Factor Conformability
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In equations 2.10 and 2.11, was assumed to represent that
level of output which results in the maximum efficiency
associated with the fixed factor. Average costs of production
are therefore minimized. When rents are imputed based upon the
optimal level of utilization, minimum adjusted average cost
occurs at the same level of output as minimum unadjusted average
C08 t .
The relationship between the fixed cost imputation and the
variable cost imputation is not readily obvious in Marshall's
machine example. It is, however, determinate. The fixed rental
was given by:
2.4) rf (R "m R.)l S.l
The variable rental was given by,
2*15) rv = [Rm - V^L *
The relationship of the adjusted curves is seen therefore to
depend upon the relationship between S. and q /q . Note, qT wasX t jL jl
assumed to be equal to times some constant for simplicity.
This relationship will actually depend upon the form of the
production function. The relationships between the variable and
fixed adjusted curves is perfectly determinate.
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Summary
This chapter examined the conditions which give rise to
rents. Rental income was seen to depend upon an upward sloping
long-run industry supply curve, where the upward slope is due to
pecuniary external diseconomies. Real external diseconomies
cause the long-run industry supply curve to be upward sloping but
do not result in the emergence of rental income.
It was also indicated that the generalization of the
representative firm obscures the obvious fact that the economic
landscape is characterized by firms with varying cost structures.
Low cost producers receive economic rents for their greater
efficiency. However, these rents should not be viewed as
surpluses. They reflect the opportunity costs of the resources
employed. When the proper imputations reflecting the opportunity
cost8 of specialized resources are made, all firms are seen to
operate at the same level of minimum average cost. The optimal
scale of output will vary between firms, however.
Two methods of imputation were presented, the fixed cost
imputation used by Machlup and Robinson was mathematically
derived. The propriety of this type of imputation requires
opportunity costs to be independent of the level of resource
utilization. Such an assumption is questionable. An alternative
imputational technique was developed. This variable ascription
is consistent with Marshall's concept of rent. It is also
consistent with the concept of factor conformability.
The types of imputations proposed are appropriate for
factors of production which are differentiated either by their
costs to various firms or by the differentials in quality of the
factors. Rentals for uncertainty have not been explicitly
considered. In the following chapters the discussion is
broadened to encompass rentals for uncertainty in a competitive
oligopolistic industry.
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CHAPTER III
THE RENTAL FOR UNCERTAINTY ON INVESTMENT
Frank Knight viewed risk as a legitimate cost of doing
business. He concluded that the residuals viewed as accounting
profits include returns for risk. Inter-industry differences in
the rate of profit find their validity in risk differentials.
Knight distinguished between risk and uncertainty. Whereas risk
is subject to quantification, uncertainty is not.
Machlup viewed accounting revenues in excess of accounting
costs as being composed of two elements. The first element is
rent and the second is economic profit. Rents derive from either
factor scarcity or qualitative differences. The part of
accounting profits which is incapable of imputation to a specific
production factor is economic profit. Within the context of
Machlup's thought system, risk may be viewed as giving rise to
rentals. Uncertainty gives rise to economic profits, since it is
not subject to objective quantification.
For operational purposes, Greenhut accepts Knight's
distinction between risk and uncertainty. He proposes an
imputational procedure for uncertainty. This procedure is not
dependent upon a priori probability assignments. It depends only
upon the entrepreneur's ability to evaluate his personal
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preferences toward uncertain prospects. This evaluation process
may or may not involve probability assignments.
The term "economic profits" in Machlup's analysis represents
the rental for uncertainty in Greenhut's context. While these
profits are shown to persist in long-run equilibrium, they are,
at the same time, legitimate costs of production. In customary
usage, economic profit refers to a residual in excess of the full
costs of production. In Greenhut's long-run analysis, profits
are just sufficient to offset the full economic cost of
uncertainty. There will be no residuals over it.
The emphasis upon the meaning of "economic profits" is
critical to Greenhut's theory of the firm. He demonstrates that
Chamberlinian tangency solutions are, in general, inconsistent
with the existence of uncertainty. Chamberlin did not explicitly
consider imputations for the cost of uncertainty. His tangency
solution yields no economic profits. In Greenhut's analysis of
Chamberlin's theory, economic profits typically persist.
Greenhut emphasizes the relationship between a spatial
economic order and uncertainty. He explicitly views the economic
order as one in which perfect competition is unlikely to persist.
Competitive oligopoly is the dominant market structure which
emerges in the real world space economies. His view of long-run
equilibrium, however, does not depend upon spatial
considerations.
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Greenhut's analysis is strongly tied to his concept of
opportunity cost. The measurement of opportunity cost
underscores the determinant long-run equilibrium which emerges
from this analysis.
Opportunity Costs
Machlup and Robinson proposed to impute the difference
between incurred accounting costs and the full opportunity cost
of a scarce factor. They both employed a fixed cost imputation.
In the explanation of the diagram where Machlup depicts the
imputation for rent, he states,
If the new average cost curve including
rent is drawn (by spreading the total
rent over the output and adding it to
the average cost without rent), this
curve, AC_, must of necessity have its
lowest point in P and thus be tangent to
the new demand curve [19, 289].
In Machlup's figure 14 a fixed cost imputation is depicted. The
parenthetical phrase in the above quote indicates that Machlup is
adding the fixed quantity, r/q where q is the output associated
with minimum SAC to the unadjusted short-run average costs of
production.
Elsewhere, Machlup states,
... The supposed adjustment refers only
to average cost and not to marginal cost...
The marginal costs of production are the
same whether they are calculated on the
basis of the old or the revised average
total cost figures or even without any
fixed costs at all [19, 291-292].
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Joan Robinson also proposes a fixed cost imputation. In the
explanation of her figure 41, she states, "Since the inclusion
of rent adds to total costs a lump sum which is independent of
the firm's output (given the price of the commodity), the
marginal cost curve cuts A', as well as A, at its minimum point",
[26, 126]. In this figure A' is the rent adjusted average cost
curve, A is the unadjusted average cost curve, and marginal cost
is stationary. Both Machlup and Robinson implicitly assumed that
a factor's foregone earnings represented the appropriate value to
be ascribed. They remained silent concerning the discounting of
foregone opportunities. They may have implicitly assumed,
however, that Marshall's method of discounting applied.
Marshall recognized that the current value of a factor
represented the discounted flow of expected earnings over its
economic lifetime. Greenhut also discounts these earnings.
However, he discounts earnings not only to reflect the marginal
rate of time preference, but also to reflect the uncertainty
associated with these earnings. Given two monetarily equivalent
flows of receipts, the more uncertain flow will have a lower
opportunity cost. This discounting procedure reflects an
individual'8 preference for the more certain flow.
The identification of the best alternative strongly depends
upon estimates of the degree of uncertainty associated with
varying prospects, and the evaluator's response to it. This
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ranking of alternatives is not necessarily dependent upon a
priori probability assignments. The measurement of lost
opportunities is predicated upon the discounted "income utils"
expected to be received by a factor in alternative employments.
The individual optimizes utility when he equilibrates the ratios
of discounted expected income utils to the expected energy
expenditures for all choice alternatives. This procedure is the
counterpart in classical economics of equilibrating the ratios of
marginal utility to product price. The composite discount to be
applied reflects the personal rate of time preference as well as
relative preferences for a given type of energy expenditure.
Greenhut refers to the latter type of discount as a special
discount, the employment preference discount. This special
discount influences the composite discount. The discounts for
time preference and employment preference are not necessarily
additive. The employment preference discount will also reflect
the uncertainty associated with a prospect.
The employment preference discount, d, may be expressed as,
3.1) d = f[I, E]
where I represents income and E represents energy requirements.
Assume the existence of two alternative employments with their
associated streams of income. Alternative one may involve lower
expected costs in terms of mental and physical health, or
uncertainty. The special discount applied to this prospect would
be less than that applied to alternative two. If the expected
income streams are monetarily equivalent, alternative one would
yield a greater discounted ratio of income utils to energy
expenditures than alternative two.
£
Let r_. be defined as the expected net revenues associated
with an alternative activity in time period j. If the factor in
£
question is capital, r^ refers to gross revenues less
£
depreciation. With respect to the human factor, r^ may be
viewed as referring to gross revenues less work-related expenses
such as clothing costs, personal travel expense, etc. The stream
of such revenues is discounted by the composite discount c. The
average expected revenue over the life of the alternative is
given by,
3.2) ra = ” [r.a/(l + c)j]/n
J-l J
The symbols s and s' are used below to identify the optimal
levels of energy expenditures per calendar period in the chosen
activity and the best alternative activity, respectively. The s
need not be equal to s', as the optimal level of energy
expenditure may be expected to vary among activities. In fact,
the optimal level of energy expenditures within any given
activity will also vary among evaluators. Thus, s may be viewed
as the acceptable transform of sf between the two activities,
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albeit s may still be preferred to s' or vice versa. Any
preference for s will be reflected by the application of a lower
discount rate than that applied to s'.
The selection of an activity is governed by the factor's
expectation that he will expend s energy utils per calendar
period, and the acceptance of s as the acceptable transform of
s'. Selection of the activity associated with s requires that
the total discounted income utils of the subject activity be
preferred to those associated with the alternative activity. The
total discounted income utils are given by £ w^ in the following
equation,
n
3.3) E w. = n(ra)
j-i J
Employment preference in turn is governed by,
m m m(+) n
3.4) £ w. Z sJ > E w' . E s' .
i-i 1 i-i 1 " j-i J j=i J
where m and n stand for the corresponding lengths of the economic
lifetimes associated with the two activities. The variables 8
and s' are expressed in terms of the annuity of equal annual
energy expenditures associated with the discounted income utils,
w and w'.
Whenever m > n, the income-energy ratio in the selected
activity must be compared with the alternate income-energy ratio
over the same m years. The economic lifetime in the alternate
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activity must be supplemented by a period of years (n+1,..., m)
over which returns on accrued savings are received. The symbol +
in equation 4 is used to convey this concept.
If m < n, the income-energy ratio in the selected activity
must be compared with the alternate ratio over the same n years.
In this case, the m(+) symbol would apply to the left-hand side
of equation 3.4 with related adjustments made on both sides.
When the employment preference formula holds as a strict
equality, the individual will be indifferent between the two
activities and their associated lifetimes. When the greater-than
expression holds, it provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for the selection of the subject activity vis a vis the
alternate activity.
Greenhut's employment preference formula does not provide
the lost opportunity cost per se; as indicated, expression 4)
simply identifies the activity selected and the opportunity
foregone. An optimal rate of return, Rq, is identifiable for the
best alternate activity. This R is the average of the
o
discounted income utils received per average energy utils
expended. Mathematically, it is defined by:
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n
3.5) R = (1/n) * [ l (w.'/s')]
° jj=l
n
where s' = (1/n) * ( £ s.).
j-i J
(w^'/s') is expressed as a rate per average energy
expenditure. It may be viewed as the dollars per kilowatt hour
of energy expenditure. It may also be viewed as the income utils
per util of energy expenditure. The latter is probably more
consistent with the manner in which choices are actually made.
R is the optimal alternative rate of return which would be
o
received on the average in the best alternate employment.
Equation 3.5 may be rewritten as,
n
3.6) n’R = E (w.'/s').
o . , 1
J“1
The recovery of the full opportunity cost in the chosen
activity requires equivalence of the total optimal returns over
the chosen activity's economic lifetime with those of the best
alternative. This condition is given by,
3.7) mR = nR .
o
This equation permits the mapping of Rq from the alternate
activity into a transformed rate R, such that the entrepreneur is
indifferent between the two streams of income.^- R is given by,
1. In recent lectures, Greenhut has proposed that when
Footnote 1 Continued on Next Page
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n
3.8) R = (1/m) * [ Z (w.'/s')].
j=l J
Note at this juncture that we are now referring strictly to
entrepreneurial investment. As such, our opportunity cost
concept no longer relates to all factors of production,
including, of course, managerial services. This means that
instead of the employment preference basis which distinguished
income utils from working lifetimes of different m's and n's, we
are now alone considering investment lifetimes. These too, of
course, may differ. However, to the extent that any differences
Footnote 1 Continued from Previous Page
opportunity costs are ascribed for the entrepreneur's
services, the longest working lifetime should serve as the
basis for the imputation. For example, if the subject
activity allows only m years of work which, let us assume,
is less than the n years that the individual could (would)
work in the alternate activity, the required R will be
greater than Rq,, This condition would require an income
stream for the m nonworking years to be added to the
income in the m working years so that the aggregate
satisfies the employment preference formula. If m>n, the
resulting lower R,signifies an income stream for the lost
opportunity for n years which, when added to the n years
(=m), provides a total income stream in that alternate
activity which is equal to or less than in the subject,
selected activity.
Now, when the imputation is effected not for services
but for the lost investment income, Greenhut proposes we
should conceive of m n instead of allowing the
inequality. Thus if m<n, he would impute as if the years
of the alternative investment only lasted m not n years, in
effect imagining that another investment woul<l generate a
sufficient new income stream over the extra m years that
when added to m equals the n years of income in the last
alternative. And if m>n, he proposes a comparison (and
imputations) for n years only via the assumption that a new
income stream over the alternative investment n years
Footnote 1 Continued on Next Page
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exist, we can either add to or substitute from the alternative
income stream what could be obtained in the next investment which
brings n's investment period up to m or brings m's investment
period up to n. As such, the effective m and n values in
equation 3.7 become the same. (Later on, we shall propose that a
different value for m and n can be used to differentiate the
uncertainty that characterizes the selected activity vis a vis
the uncertainty involved in the alternative investment.)
Associated with R is an optimal absolute dollar (income-
util) return, r, which is sought by the entrepreneur. This r
corresponds to the factor cost assigned as a fixed cost by
Machlup and Robinson. It is defined as,
3.9) r = R s.
It is the optimal average rate of return in the subject activity
times the average level of energy expenditures in that activity.
It is the amount assignable on the average to any of the ith
periods. This amount must be defrayed to justify the selection
of the subject activity.
Footnote 1 Continued from Previous Page
would balance the income involved during the years m>n. In
still other words, he takes the shorter period of m or n,
thus leaving the discount factor alone as the variable to
equilibrate differential uncertainties on investments. In
contrast to the human services case, where laws, labor
union-company policies, or simple factor preference make m
often unequal to n, it is suggested that investments can
always be conceived to run for identical periods. So, for
Footnote 1 Continued on Next Page
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Greenhut's methodology with respect to the measurement of
opportunity cost is both innovative and comprehensive. This
measurement takes cognizance of factor depreciation, uncertainty,
and personal attitudes towards different employments. It
represents an extension of the concept of opportunity cost to
human factors of production. It recognizes the utility
maximizing behavior of the human factor. The measurement of
opportunity cost forms the basis for the imputational procedures
employed.
Imputational Procedures
Greenhut approaches the problem of imputing opportunity
costs from a different perspective than Machlup and Robinson.
They concentrated upon the imputation of the difference between a
factor's income and the full opportunity cost of the factor.
Greenhut's approach is to impute the full opportunity cost to the
other factor costs of production.
Marshall also emphasized the imputation of the full
opportunity costs of production. He states:
We may now discuss the question under what
head to class those extra incomes which
are earned by extraordinary natural abilities.
Since they are not the result of the
investment of human effort in an agent of
production for the purpose of increasing
Footnote 1 Continued from Previous Page
simplicity, Greenhut selects the shorter of the m, n
periods as the basis for the imputation.
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its efficiency, there is a strong prima
facie case for regarding them as producer's
surplus, resulting from the possession of
a differential advantage for production,
freely given by nature... But when we
are considering the whole body of those
engaged in any occupation, we are not at
liberty to treat the exceptionally high
earnings of successful men as rent, without
making allowances for the low earnings of
those who fail... These fortunes are
therefore part of the price that is paid
in the long run for the supply of labor and
ability that seeks the occupation: they
enter into the true or "long period" normal
supply price of labour in it [21, 577-578].
Elsewhere, Marshall states, "...the greatest caution is required
in the application of the term producer's surplus to the earnings
of extraordinary ability", [21. 579]. It is apparent that
Marshall recognized the true nature of rent as a legitimate cost
of production. Thus Greenhut's approach is more akin to
Marshall's than to Machlup's or Robinson's, who tended to view
differential rent as a residual. These different perspectives
are in no sense inconsistent, however.
Greenhut analyzes the effects of both fixed and variable
imputations for opportunity costs. Both methodologies yield the
same results with respect to the long-run equilibrium
characteristics of the competitive-oligopoly firm.
In equation 3.9, s is the optimal average expenditure of
energy (optimal cost investment dollars, if you prefer) in the
chosen activity. In figure 3.1, s is given by the area OABC.
The dollar expenditure OABC is the transform of 6 energies into
dollars.
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Figure 3.1* The Transformation of Energy
Expenditures into Dollars
'There, are several reasons for associating s, and therefore
GAB'C, with the optimal cost levels
1} There is a need to establish some: base or common
criterion as a point of reference. QABC is easily identifiable
for the subject firm.. It is readily identifiable for every firm
within the industry, as well as for' all finis in all industries.
It provides a consistent point of reference.
2) OABC is the analog of perfect coapet.ition. as viewed in
traditional theory. The association of s with the optimal level
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of energy expenditures permits an easy comparison of the results
of this theory with those of traditional theory.
3) OABC is consistent with the concept of factor conform
ability. This concept was previously alluded to in the
discussion of variable cost imputations. It plays a major role
in the formulation of Greenhut's model. With respect to the
considerations concerning efficiency, conformability is shown by
the consistency of s with its transform OABC.
Consider an entrepreneur within an industry where the
optimal level of energy expenditures are given by some known
quantity. This quantity results in the maximum physical
productivity of the factor. If a firm employs a unit of the
factor which is not conformable, the firm will be a high cost
producer relative to other firms within the industry. Such a
firm is unlikely to survive in the long run. An exception would
occur if the subject firm held some other off-setting production
advantage. In the absence of such offsets, all factors must be
conformable in the activity of their employment. OABC reflects
the conformability of the entrepreneur to the technological
relations of production. Offsets would be eliminated in time
under free entry, exit conditions with factors mobile in the long
run at least.
4) OABC reflects the concept of the viability of the firm.
The average cost curve in figure 3.1 reflects all costs exclusive
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of the return for uncertainty on the investment. The firm with
the least cost exclusive of rents is the most likely to survive
in the long run. This point is brought to focus by considering
an industry where price wars may be expected to occur. The firm
with the lowest average cost is certainly the most likely to
survive such a war. Thus, it is said to be a prospective viable
firm.
'*8 as the Transform of OABC"
The concept s was originally defined as the optimal level
of energy expenditures in the selected activity. It therefore
represents the total current investment of the firm in terms of
energy expenditures. R represents the dollars per unit energy
expenditure required by a factor. The factor must earn R dollars
per energy unit in order to cover its full opportunity cost. So
r is the absolute dollar return required in a factor's optimal
use, at its optimal level of energy expenditures. We find that
r, R, and s were originally defined as:
3.10) r = R * s
dollars dollars per energy
energy unit units
Figure 3.1 transforms r, R, and s to establish:
3.11) r = Rt s
dollars dollars per dollars of
dollar's worth energy
of energy
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By way of example, assume that one hundred dollars will
purchase five units of energy. Then the physical quantity s is
being transferred into the dollar value of the quantity, (s^), at
a rate of twenty dollars per unit of energy. If the required net
rate of return per unit of s is $10, the factor must earn $50 to
recover its full opportunity cost. The rate of return per
dollar's worth of energy (R^) must be transformed in inverse
proportion to the rate at which s is transformed into s^. A
dollar's worth of energy must net 1/20 of $10, or 50 cents in
order for $100 to yield a net rental of $50. The following table
summarizes this argument.
Table 3.1. The Transformation of R into R^,
r — R x s
$50 = $10 5
(1) = (1/20)
.
20 rates of
transformation
$50 = $0.50 $100
rt
= R
t ST
In table 3 .1, s (5 units) is transformed into s^, ($100) at a rate
of $20 per unit. The rate of return R($10) is transformed into
*T ($0.50) at a rate of $1.20. Most importantly, note that r is
transformed into r at a rate of 1. In other words, there is a
direct one-to-one correspondence between r and rfc. The same
total net rental, r=rT, must be earned on an investment of s (or
s^,) regardless of the units in which the investment is
denominated, that is, whether investment is viewed as the number
of energy units or as the dollar value of these units.
"Fixed and Variable Cost Imputations"
The set of cost curves exclusive of the uncertainty
opportunity cost on investment will be referred to as the
classical cost curves. The opportunity cost to be ascribed to
these curves is given by,
3.12) r = R
s
where e refers to the optimal level of energy expenditures which
would occur in the selected alternative activity. Let e
substitute for the optimal s level of energy expenditures in the
selected activity, so that we can use e' to designate the actual
level of energy expenditures that may apply to the chosen
activity. Then r' designates the actual rental incurred, where
the value r' is given by:
3.13) r' = Re'
When e' » e, the actual level of energy expenditures in the
chosen activity is equal to the planned s level of energy
expenditures. When e' and e are equal, r' and r are equal, and
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the full opportunity cost of uncertainty on the investment will
be recovered. But, it is possible that the actual level of
energy expenditures will diverge from the optimal level in the
chosen activity, as e' may be greater than, equal to, or less
than e. The full opportunity cost of uncertainty on the
investment will be covered in the long-run equilibrium which will
only occur when e' is equal to e. Now the rent r, which we note
is associated with the opportunity cost of uncertainty on
investment, may be ascribed either as a fixed cost or as a
variable cost. These ascriptions are shown in figure 3.2.
Fixed Cost Imputation Variable Cost Imputation
Figure 3.2. Fixed and Variable Cost Imputations for
Energy Rentals
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In this and the following figures, the prime symbol is used to
indicate a variable cost imputation, while the subscript c will
be used to indicate cost curves exclusive of rents for
uncertainty.
The relationship between Greenhut's variable and fixed
imputations is illustrated in figure 3.3.
In accordance with the concept of factor conformabi1ity, the
full opportunity cost associated with uncertainty must be
*
recovered at the technologically optimal level of production, q .
•k
TC and TC^' must therefore intersect at q . Accordingly, the
0 q* q
Figure 3.3. The Relationship of the TC' and TC
r r
Curves
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adjusted average cost curves must also intersect at q . The
relationships between the adjusted cost curves are illustrated in
figure 3.4.
The choice of imputational methods is not a matter of
indifference. Classical imputations for rents were traditionally
associated with such functional inputs as land or capital. As
inputs into the production process, the level of output will vary
with the intensity of factor application. The ascription of
rents for functional inputs will cause the marginal and average
cost curves to shift upwards. Variable cost imputations are
4-
0 e ee
Figure 3.4. The Fixed and Variable-Adjusted
Average and Marginal Cost Curves
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appropriate where functional inputs are involved.
Uncertainty is not a functional input. The level of output
does not vary with the degree of uncertainty. The production map
is unaffected by the application of uncertainty. The appropriate
imputation for uncertainty is a lump-sum ascription to total
cost. Such ascriptions do not affect the classical marginal cost
curve. The cost of uncertainty will increase dollar per dollar
invested since r' = Re'. Unlike other factors, uncertainty is
not a functional input. Its rental should, therefore, be imputed
as a fixed cost.
In figure 3.4, OABC is the transform of the optimal level
of energy expenditures, e, in the selected activity. If average
revenue is very high, marginal revenue will intersect marginal
cost at a level of output at which average revenue is greater
than adjusted average cost. The total return to the entrepreneur
exceeds technological costs plus the uncertainty cost. This
windfall will induce entry, which shifts average revenue to the
left. If average revenue lies below adjusted average cost at all
levels of output, losses are incurred. The resulting exit of
firms from the Industry will shift average revenue to the right.
In the short run, equilibrium occurs where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. Long-run equilibrium requires the tangency
of average revenue to the fixed adjusted average cost at a level
of output associated with minimum classical average cost. This
requirement will be expanded upon in some detail below. Long-run
equilibrium is illustrated in figure 3.5.
Unlike Marshall, Machlup, and Robinson, Greenhut's analysis
permits the accrual of rents in long-run equilibrium. His
analysis is distinguished from their analyses since he views
rents as variable factor costs rather than as residuals,
relegating profits alone to the latter role.
0 e ee
Figure 3.5. Oligopolistic Equilibrium and
Rental Imputations
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The Chamberlin Tangeney
Chamberlin claimed production would occur at an output less
than that associated with minimum average cost. He described the
difference between minimum-cost production and the actual level
of production as excess capacity. If Chamberlin was referring to
the fixed adjusted average cost curve, production does occur at a
cost in excess of the minimum. His concept of excess capacity
has no clear significance along this curve. Furthermore, as
Greenhut indicates, there is only one unique Chamberlinian
tangency that represents a stable equilibrium. It is the
tangency associated with minimum classical average cost. This
result will be demonstrated in the following discussion by
reference to figure 3.6.
If Chamberlin envisioned a fixed cost adjusted average cost
curve, point F could reflect his stable equilibrium. However, at
point F the owner's investment is less than optimal. OA'B'C' is
less than OABC. e1 is less than e. The owner receives a rental
equal to the difference between the adjusted and unadjusted
average cost curves. The rental is given by r - Re', where r
would be the desired rental. The owner's desired r is based upon
energy expenditure e, or investment expenditure OABC. But at F
he is receiving r for energy or investment expenditures of e' and
OA'B'C'. The Chamberlinian tangency solution therefore reflects
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Figure 3.6. The Instability of a Chamberlinian
Tangency to the ACr Curve
profits vis-a-vis other industries. Interindustry equilibrium
will only occur when r is received for e energy expenditures.
The existence of the windfall will attract entry. The firm's
average revenue curve will shift to the left and flatten out.
The Chamberlin equilibrium at point F is therefore unstable.
Chamberlin indicated that there would be no profits or
losses at his equilibrium, where marginal revenue equals marginal
cost. In the sense that precisely r dollars for uncertainty are
being recovered at point F, Chamberlin is correct. However, r is
the appropriate rental only for e energy expenditures. The
possibility that e' is equal to e at point F is inconsistent with
the concept of factor conformability.
It is conceivable that the average revenue curve may shift
so that it is just tangent to the variable adjusted average cost
curve AC^' shown in figure 3.7. Point G in figure 3.6 would also
be unstable.
At output OA’ , a tangency of AR to AC^' would make marginal
revenue equal to the variable adjusted marginal cost, MC^'. This
adjusted marginal cost reflects what the entrepreneurs view as
their best alternative. However, the accountant-engineers can
only view the classical marginal cost curve as the relevant
curve. Since marginal revenue exceeds classical marginal cost,
they will seek to expand production. If the entrepreneur
restricted production to OA', the accountant-engineers might wish
to enter the industry on their own elsewhere. Entry would induce
a further flattening and leftward shift of the marginal revenue
curve. The entrepreneur, however is also unlikely to want to
restrict output to OA', since the entrepreneur originally desired
the optimally ordered energy and investment expenditure of e and
OABC. By receiving r' for energy, investment expenditures e' and
OA'B'C', he is frustrated since r' is less than the desired
rental, r. (Recall that the AC curve reflects the rental r at
r
all levels of output. Note further that at OA' units of
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Figure 3.7. The Instability of a Chamberlinian
Tangency to the AC^ Curve
production, AC^.' lies below AC^. Therefore r' Is less than r.)
The owner is not earning the rate R on [e-e'] or its transform,
[OABC - OA'B'C']* the unrealized level of investment. Instead,
he is earning rate R on only e', the actual level of energy
expenditure. Thus, he does not realize the desired level of
revenue, r = R .
e
The classical marginal revenue curve does not reflect the
desired rentals. Where a variable adjustment is employed, it is
necessary to adjust the marginal revenue curve artificially.
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Such an adjusted marginal revenue curve will reflect the desired
level of rentals, just as the variable adjusted MC curve reflects
the factor's conception of "rental" costs.
The adjustment to marginal cost is given by R as indicated
in Chapter II. R may be written as [R * q ] / q or r'/q. Let the
adjustment to marginal revenue be given only by r/q (not r'/q).
The artificially adjusted marginal revenue is then given by MRc +
r/q, whereas the adjusted marginal cost is given by MCc + r'/q.
They are equal only when r' equals r. In still other words, the
rental actually received will be equal to the optimally ordered
rental when e = e'. When classical marginal revenue equals
adjusted marginal cost, the adjusted marginal revenue exceeds the
adjusted marginal cost. The owner will then optimize his
behavior by expanding production until adjusted marginal revenue
equals adjusted marginal cost.
A tangency solution will be stable only when both the owner
and the accountant-engineers view the level of production as
optimal. These two requirements are fulfilled when adjusted
marginal revenue equals adjusted marginal cost, and when their
classical counterparts are equal. The tangency in figure 3.7 at
D is unstable because MR > MC . Since MR = MC ' it must be the
c c c r
case that artificial MR > MC '. Therefore, both the owner as
r r
well as the accountant-engineers will want to expand production
given an output less than OA.
The intuitive appeal of the owner's desire to expand
production is revealed by reference to a practical example.
Consider the entrepreneur to be a self-employed insurance agent.
The agent desires to work 50 hours a week and earn an income of
$70,000 a year. If total energy expenditures are 2,500 hours, R
will be equal to $28 per hour. Suppose the demand for his
services is such that he currently earns $56,000 a year based
upon 2,000 hours of work. While still earning $28 per hour, the
agent would prefer to increase his energy expenditures from 40
hours per week to 50 hours per week. If able to do so, he would
earn an additional $14,000 per year. If market conditions are
inconsistent with his desires, he will move to an alternative
employment in which his income is consistent with his intended
level of energy expenditures. Exit of such agents will induce
rightward shifts of the average revenue curves faced by the
remaining agents.
The Stable Equilibrium Tangency
There is one unique stable equilibrium. It is depicted in
figure 3.8. The adjusted marginal revenue curve is not depicted,
since it merely represents an operational procedure. It would be
parallel to classical marginal revenue and exceed it by the
amount R, where R is defined to be equal to r/q, as in Chapter II
I0 e'= e ee
Figure 3.8. A Stable Tangency Solution
2
[13]* Adjusted marginal revenue must pass through point E.
Under such conditions MR = MC T, MR = MC , e1 = e, and rf = r.
r r c c
No excess capacity exists since the firm produces at the minimum
technological average cost of production.
Adherence to the fictional concept of the representative
firm places restrictions upon the characterization of long-run
industry equilibrium. All surviving entrepreneurs come to demand
2. In Greenhut’s analysis, the adjustment is given by <}>
r/q. Thus and R represent the same adjustment.
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the same rentals for their services. They will also expend the
same optimal level of energy expenditures. Indeed, it is
possible to relate the observation of such characteristics to
certain industries. Such industries will be characterized by a
widely-shared knowledge of the current state of technology as it
applies to the industry. Factors of production including the
human factor will be characterized by a high degree of
homogeneity.
In industries where factors of production tend to be
heterogeneous, a distribution of multi-sized firms will emerge.
In Chapter I, it was noted that Marshall used the concept of the
"representative firm" to indicate that in long-run competitive
equilibrium, all firms operate at the same level of minimum
average cost. He did not associate the common level of minimum
average cost with a common level of output, as is often done in
the modern treatment [21, 579]. Marshall considered a spaceless
economy. In such an economy, firms will not be as readily
characterized by different cost structures as in the space
economy.
In a spatial economy, geographically distinct producers face
spatially differentiated demands. Not only are cost curves
differentiated by heterogeneous factors of production, but firms
will also choose different optimal plant sizes due to the
differential demands. In both the spaceless and spatial cases,
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firms may be characterized by distinct cost structures. The
optimal level of energy expenditures will vary from firm to firm,
as will the rentals paid to the entrepreneurs. Each firm will,
however, operate at the same level of minimum average
technological cost.
Summary
The view of long-run equilibrium proposed in this chapter is
based upon Greenhut' s A Theory of the Firm in Economic Space
[13]. Indeed it is so dependent upon this work that it would be
operationally impractical to employ extensive footnotes.
Greenhut's theory of the imputed uncertainty cost on an
investment can be summed up by resorting to a device he has used
in lectures. Define the required rental as:
I) r = RS = RACQq0,
where subscript 0 stands for the optimal cost point. Let the
actual rental be given by:
i i
II) r = Rs = RAC q ,ana
where subscript a stands for the actual level of output. The
actual rental may alternatively be defined as:
i i
III) r = Rs = RAC„q .0 a
Let equation I be referred to as the adjustment and equation II
as the adjustment. Next define the total cost function as:
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111) C = f^Q),
where f^(Q) is a cubic function which generates a monotonieslly
increasing cost as total output Q increases. Then:
112) C* = f1(Q) + u,
where u = u(Q) = f2(Q), and where f2(Q) = Thus C = f^(Q)
+ ¥ fX(Q)>
*
H3) MC ” dQ ” flQ + f2Q ^ + ^flQ
and
"a5
*
AC
c* f^Q) f2(Q)
Q~ + Q + Q
(1 + )f1(Q)
Q
It further follows from III that
1111) C “ f(Q).
Then:
1112) C* = f(Q) + u,
where u = u(Q) = <j> Q. Therefore, C - f(Q) + $ q,
1113) W - f Q+ ♦ .
and
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in.) ac* = £ = «s> + *-s - m. + * .4 Q Q Q Q
i
It is manifest that the II conception of r entails:
II ) r = ij>fx(Q) = ^ aca<1a*
Therefore,
II' ') i|> = R,
where R is the rate of return as a function of dollar investment.
i
The III conception of r establishes:
III') r ” Q = KAC0qA,
which means,
III' * ) <f> = RAC0,
where RACq is the dollar requirement due to the percent R on the
ACrt amount ). Of course, AC > ACrt for all a fu a u
Note that the tangency to the fixed cost (r) adjusted curve
induces entry because of the windfall profits which exist. Now,
we find that the disparity between MR and MC due to equating MR
*
with MC [when uncertainty is imputed by the entrepreneur-
investor as a variable factor in perfect conformance to
technology (the adjustment) or to output (the <{> adjustment)]
would also induce new entry by erstwhile accountants, engineers,
economists. In fact, Greenhut proposes additionally for any
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tangency to an r adjusted curve that, besides the hired inputs,
*
equating MR to MC signifies disequilibrium in the mind s eye of
the entrepreneur also.
According to Greenhut, entrepreneurs aspire to the return r,
i
not r . Because of this, he then defines an MR adjustment (in
the mind's eye of the entrepreneur) as:
i ^0%
A) if, = - = — = RAC (>1)
q., o
for all tangencies where qn > q . He also defines a proxyU 3
"k
related ip for II as:
B)
i
r
RAC q
a a
q
a
RAC • a
For III we then have:
C) RAC Q= <J> .
Note that the numerator in the third term of (A) is greater than
1 * *
in (B). Thus > ip > <{> . So besides the expert's
disequilibrium view, the entrepreneur is also in disequilibrium
i
at any tangency to an r adjusted curve. Moreover, for all
output points beyond the technological optimal cost point where
i
AR may equal the r adjusted value, we have:
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i i
A ) if* = RACQ (<1)
i
)
*
B if* = RAC , and
a
t
)
*
C <f> = RAC Q.
Hence, if* < <f> < i/> . Of course, where q = qn in the thirdd U
I ^
terms of (A), (B), and (C), ij; = \|/ = <j> . It is therefore the
case that entrepreneurial equilibrium can only attain when the
technological level of output, q , is equal to the level ofd
output associated with the optimal cost point, q^.
Greenhut has extended traditional microeconomic theory to
describe realistically the process whereby rentals for
uncertainty accrue to firms. These rentals appear as economic
profits from an accounting aspect. They represent true costs of
production and will persist in long-run equilibrium. Qualitative
differences in factors, including the entrepreneurs, will result
in a size distribution of firms within an industry. Firms will
differ not only in the scale of production, but also with respect
to the level of reported profits. This result has important
implications for the enforcement of antitrust policy. Market
shares and high rates of profit are shown to be inappropriate
criteria for the determination of the degree of competition.
These results also provide important implications for public
policy towards business. The expansion of petroleum resources
in the face of increasing demand entails increased uncertainty.
Firms will be unwilling to expand exploration activities where
the opportunity cost of uncertainty cannot be recovered.
Windfall profit taxes are counter to the public desire for
expanded energy supplies.
Greenhut's analysis is consistent with an interindustry
dispersion of profits. Industries characterized by high levels
of risk and uncertainty will be characterized by high levels of
accounting profits. Risk and uncertainty represent legitimate
costs of production. High accounting profits do not necessarily
reflect any economic profits in long-run competitive-oligopoly
equilibrium.
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CHAPTER IV
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF GREENHUT EQUILIBRIA
The Greenhut equilibria described in Chapter III appear in a
highly abstracted form in Theory of the Firm [13]- This theory
is rich in the sense that it is consistent with, and unifying of,
much of traditional microeconomic theory. In order to reinforce
the sustainability of Greenhut equilibria it is appropriate to
examine the theoretical bases of his imputational procedures. In
particular, the following issues will be addressed in this
chapter.
First, it is necessary to show that sustainable equilibria
exist. Chapter III of the present work accepted existence a
priori and merely described the properties associated with such
equilibria. Second, the distinction between the terms explicit,
implicit, functional, and non-functional inputs must be carefully
differentiated. This is necessary to properly distinguish
Greenhut*s work form that of Chamberlin, Machlup, and Robinson.
These distinctions bear upon the appropriateness of Greenhut*s
imputational procedure. Third, Greenhut*s work is fundamentally
differentiated from that of Chamberlin. It is associated with
strong welfare implications for society. It is towards these
questions that we now turn.
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Existence
As previously indicated, the problem of existence was
basically ignored in Chapter III, It may be argued that demand
conditions are limited so that the market will not support n
firms, all operating at minimum efficient scale. In Chapter 8 of
The Theory of the Firm, Greenhut specifically addresses this
issue. Greenhut posits the existence of multiplant firms where
the required energy expenditures associated with multiplant
production are a positive function of the number of production
facilities.
Greenhut proposes the existence of an implicit cost
function,
4.1) H [C,q,m,m']
where C is the level of cost, q is output, m is the size of an
individual production facility associated with fixed capital
investment, and m* is the number of production facilities
operated by the firm. This function is associated with a family
of average cost curves which are differentiated by the number of
production facilities. The difference between these curves
reflects differences in required energy expenditures and
therefore the opportunity costs of the owners-managers of the
firms. It is possible to construct an envelope curve of the LRAC
curves associated with different numbers of plants. For any
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level of output there will exist an optimal number of plants
which minimize the cost of production. If market demand is
"large" relative to minimum efficient scale, all firms will
operate the same number of production facilities, i.e. they will
employ the configuration which minimizes long-run average cost.
However, where market demand is "small" relative to minimum
efficient scale, total production may be partitioned among a size
distribution of firms. The existence of a sustainable
distribution is assured by the divisibility of output among firms
operating at different levels of output. In figure 4.1, any level
of industry output may be partitioned among n firms operating
under various configurations. For example, assume market demand
will only support one firm operating at minimum efficient scale.
Such a plant may operate at point A in figure 4.1. Another firm
may fulfill the residual market demand by operating at point B.
In Greenhut's theory, when the imputations for energy
expenditures and indivisibility are made, each firm will operate
at the same common level of minimum average cost. This situation
is illustrated in figure 4.2. As figure 4.2 suggests, the two
firms are differentiated by the number of plants operated by
each, the energy expenditures required by each configuration, and
therefore by the total rental earnings of the individual
entrepreneurs. Manifestly, the differential imputed earnings
will reflect varying levels of uncertainty as well.
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Figure 4.1. The Multiplant Long-Run Average Cost Curves
In this manner, existence of a sustainable equilibrium is
assured. Indeed, the continuous nature of the envelope curve
assures that a partition of market demand can always be found
which insures a solution to the existence problem.
Equally important, Greenhut's theory is consistent with
Marshall's comments concerning the fictional concept of the
"representative firm" which were referenced in Chapter III.
Casual empiricism should confirm for the reader the existence of
industries characterized by price competitiveness, the absence of
firm//I
Figure4.2.RentalImputationsfoDiff rentS zesfFirm
q2
firm//2
q
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economic profits, and multiple firm configurations. Structual
differentiation of firms may be sufficient to allow all firms in
a competitive oligopoly to produce at a common level of minimum
average cost. Excess capacity is therefore not necessarily
associated with such market structures. Indeed, if Greenhut's
analysis is correct, excess capacity will not exist in long run
equilibrium for such market structures.
The Nature of Inputs
Machlup's and Robinson's imputational procedures were
discussed in Chapter II. These rentals were viewed as reflecting
the opportunity costs of scarce factors purchased at advantageous
prices by producers. The ascriptions of opportunity costs were
meant to reflect current market prices of resources. The inputs
considered explicitly entered the production function of the
firm. Machlup and Robinson's theory of rents must be carefully
distinguished from those of Ferguson, Blaugh, Chamberlin, and
Greenhut. For purposes of analysis, the following terms must be
distinguished.
A functional input is one which directly enters the
production function of a firm, such as those discussed by Machlup
and Robinson. A non-functional input is one which does not
directly enter the production function of a firm, but whose
presence is required if production is to occur.
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Mathematically let production be characterized by the following
relation:
4.2) Q (K,L,E)
0 for E=0
Q*(K,L) for E=1
where E represents the entrepreneurial factor, which is assumed
to be a non-functional input. It assumes the binary values 0 or
1 according to whether the factor is present or not. Equation
4.2 indicates that production is not feasible when the
entrepreneurial factor is absent. When present, output is a
"k
function of K and L and is given by Q . Since energy
expenditures are a non-functional input, they do not directly
★ *
enter Q . However, various levels of Q may call forth different
levels of energy expenditures, uncertainty, etc.
Non-functional inputs also do not enter the cost functions
of the firm which are directly derived from the production
function. However, since they do reflect a real cost to society,
the opportunity costs of the entrepreneurial factor must be
imputed or ascribed to the explicit costs of the firm. Part of
the entrepreneurial factor may represent functional services and
therefore directly enter the production and cost functions of the
firm. Our attention is directed solely towards that portion of
entrepreneurial services which are non-functional in nature.
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As noted above the terms "functional" and "non-functional"
characterize the way an input enters the production function of
the firm. The terms "explicit" and "implicit" refer to the way
an input enters the cost function of a firm. By way of example,
Machlup's and Robinson's scarce resources represent functional
inputs whose cost to the firm varies from their true opportunity
cost. Blaugh considers an implicit input which directly enters
the firm's production function, but a portion of whose cost may
be shifted. He cites the example of a public transportation
facility. Machlup, Robinson, and Blaugh all considered rental
imputations for functional, implicit-cost inputs.
In Chamberlin's and Greenhut's analyses attention is focused
upon non-functional, explicit-cost factors of production. These
costs are actually born by the firm and may not be shifted.
The following contrasts may be made between the various
approaches to rental imputations based upon the distinctions
between functional, non-functional, explicit, and implicit
inputs.
In Machlup's and Robinson's approach, rentals are imputed to
reflect price differentials for scarce fixed factors of
production. Both suggest that these rentals be imputed as fixed
costs. The difficulty with such an approach is that given a
production function and knowledge of factor prices, the cost
functions may be directly derived. No imputational procedure is
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required. The rent-adjusted average cost curve of the firm
possessing a scarce factor would be the average cost curve based
upon the competitively determined opportunity cost of the
resource. Assuming the marginal firm pays a higher price for the
fixed factor than the inframarginal firm, the minimum point of
the marginal firm's LAC curve may be to the left or right of the
output associated with minimum long-run average cost of the
inframarginal producer. The relative positions of minimum long-
run average cost will depend upon the expenditure elasticity of
the scarce factor. Fixed cost imputations however always
increase the optimal scale of the firm. Machlup's and Robinson's
imputations are therefore seen to be inappropriate. Furthermore,
as stocks of the scarce factor are consumed, the firm must
replace them at the current market prices. Rentals of the type
envisioned by Machlup and Robinson cannot persist in the long run
and therefore are irrelevant when considering the welfare effects
of rental earnings.
Whereas Machlup and Robinson considered only functional,
implicit inputs, Ferguson considered functional, explicit inputs.
Ferguson's theory is a theory of quasi-rents. In his model, such
rents exist only in the short-run interim period in which entry
is precluded. They are, in effect, short-run economic profits.
With entry, price is bid down to minimum average cost and quasi¬
rents dissipate. In Ferguson's model, quasi-rents are the
motivating force which induces firms to enter the industry, thus
leading to long-run competitive equilibrium.
In Blaugh's model of rents, inputs are best described as
functional and implicit. This analysis is primarily concerned
with external effects. In Chapter II models reflecting such
effects were developed which were consistent with Blaugh’s
assumptions. These models indicated that Blaugh's results need
not attain. For present purposes there is no need to pursue a
model of rentals where production is subject to external effects.
Chamberlin's and Greenhut's models are the only models
directed towards an analysis of non-functional, explicit inputs.
It is toward a contrast in these models that we now turn. First,
however, a more detailed analysis of Greenhut's measurement of
opportunity costs is in order, since it facilitates the
understanding of the crucial differences between Greenhut's and
Chamberlin's models.
Entrepreneurial Opportunity Cost
In order to evaluate Greerhut's imputational procedure it is
enlightening to contrast this procedure with the traditional
determination of the opportunity cost of a functional input, and
with the method employed by Chamberlin.
Consider an imperfectly competitive product market where
firms purchase inputs in perfectly competitive factor markets.
In Ferguson's treatment let the production function be given by
equation 4.3 [10, 145-153].
4.3) q = f (x^.•.»x ), where
4.4) f. > 0, f.. < 0 (i=l,2,...,n).
i n
Furthermore, let the inverse demand function and the expenditure
constraint be given by equations 4.5 and 4.6.
4.5a) q = h(p), where
4.5b) h' < 0, and
4.6) C = E p.x
i i
The profit function of the firm is therefore given by revenues
minus cost, or
4.7) it = r-c = ph(p) - Ep^x^.
The first order conditions require the following equivalent
equations to hold.
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4.8a)
8it
_ 3p 3g 3c
"5x. 3q 9x. 3x .
l i l
, for i=l,2,...,n
4.8b)
3tt
MR * MP. - p.
l l
, for i=l,2,,.. . ,n
Equation 4.8b indicates that the profit maximizing firm will pay
each factor of production its marginal revenue product. The
existence of an equilibrium is assured if there exists a stable
market price such that the quantity demanded of each firm is
equal to the output of the firm, or
4.9) h(p) = f(xlSx0,...,x )l z n
Equations 4.8b and 4.9 provide n + 1 equations to solve for n + 1
unknowns (x^ though x^ and p) in terms of the parametrically
given input prices (p^ through p^). Importantly, equation 4.8b
represents the n jointly-derived input demand functions in
implicit form.
In the traditional analysis the input demand functions are
summed across j firms to yield industry demand for each input.
The input supply function is found by summing across individual
supply curves. The intersection of industry supply and demand
curves inputs yield the equilibrium input prices consistent with
the existence of product market equilibrium. A sustainable
equilibrium also requires the assumption of zero economic profits
in addition to the previously defined market clearing condition.
Furthermore, if the product market is perfectly competitive,
marginal revenue is equal to price and each unit of input is paid
the value of the marginal product of the last unit hired. Along
the expansion path it must be true that
4.10a) q e = E f.x .n
1 i
Since the function coefficient is equal to one in long run
compet itive equilibrium, the Clark-Wicksteed theorem is seen to
hold. Multiplying each side of equation 4.10a by the equilibrium
product price indicates that total revenues are just sufficient
to cover total factor costs when each factor is paid its value of
marginal product. Equation 4.10a may be rewritten as
4.10b) p *q = £ (pf^)xi
Since each unit of x^ receives the value of its marginal product
(pf^), the summation across all units of x^ and across all inputs
yields total factor costs.
If the product market is monopolistically competitive then
price will exceed marginal revenue. In a stable equilibrium the
average cost curve reflects the fact that factors are paid their
marginal revenue products. Since price must equal average cost
at a tangency solution, it is argued by Chamberlin [8, 181],
Ferguson [9, 435], and others that factors are not paid the value
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of their marginal products. Robinson refers to this situation as
monopolistic exploitation. Equation 4.10 is easily transformed
to show that total revenues are insufficient to pay the value of
marginal product. Multiply each side of this equation by P/e to
yield
4.11) pq = 1/ e p fixi*
In equation 4.11 the expression 1/e must take on a value between
zero and one under monopolistic competition. Total revenues are
therefore equal to only a fraction of the value of marginal
product summed over all inputs. Both Chamberlin [8, 215-218]
and Ferguson [9, 435] object to the use of the term "monopolistic
exploitation" since, where all inputs are functional and
explicit, the entrepreneur himself receives only his marginal
revenue product. Market conditions are such that it is not
possible to pay all factors the value of their marginal products.
The preceding analysis indicates that where all inputs are
functional and explicit, the average cost curves fully reflect
the opportunity costs of resources when the industry is in
equilibrium. This is true under any type of product market
organization as long as each factor is paid its competitively
determined wage rate.
In Chamberlin's and Greenhut' s models this traditional
theory of wage determination breaks down. When an input is non-
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functional, the marginal productivity of the input is zero, even
though production may not occur unless the factor is present.
The marginal productivity theory of factor demand cannot be
utilized to derive a demand curve for the non-functional input.
In Chamberlin's model advertising expenditures (selling expense)
are the non-functional input. The level of such expenditures is
directly related to the location of the firm's average revenue
curve. One effect of advertising expenditures is to increase the
demand for the product. With this in mind Chamberlin proposes
the following indirect method of determining the opportunity cost
of advertising expenditures.
Chamberlin suggests that the costs associated with
functional inputs be deducted from the value of the total
product, evaluated at equilibrium prices. Then the value of the
goods which are no longer produced because demand has shifted
away from them would be deducted. Such a computation would
require global knowledge concerning the equilibrium price and
output vectors for every firm and industry in the economy.
However, even when these operational difficulties are assumed
away, Chamberlin concludes that to suggest such factors are paid
in accordance with the value of their marginal products would be
a "manifest absurdity" [8, 187].
In Chamberlin's approach the social opportunity cost of
advertising is the residual left from total revenues after
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deducting the marginal revenue products of all functional inputs,
and after adjustment for the value of goods no longer produced
because of advertising-induced shifts in demand. The difficulty
with such an approach is with the second step. In equilibrium
the factor payment made for advertising expenditure must be the
residual left after deduction of functional input costs from
total revenue. By further reducing the residual for the
opportunity costs of foregone consumption, Chamberlin is
confusing a theory of wage determination with a theory of welfare
analysis. His approach would indicate that in equilibrium the
factor payment made for advertising exceeds the social value of
advertising. While this indeed may be the case, it is entirely
inconsequential when discussing the determination of equilibrium
factor payments in a monopolistically competitive industry.
Chamberlin's theory is not helpful in trying to impute the
productivity value of a non-functional input.
In Greenhut's theory, marginal productivity theory also
fails to explain the demand for non-functional inputs. Since the
input does not directly enter the production function, the
marginal product of the input cannot be computed directly.
However, Greenhut's resolution of this problem proceeds along
much different lines than the attempt by Chamberlin.
In order to appreciate the differences between the
Chamberlin and Greenhut models, a brief summary of each of these
analyses follows.
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Chamberlinian Solutions
Chamberlin actually offers three models of monopolistic
competition. The first model considers only functional inputs
where there is no active price competition. The second model
adopts the assumption of active price competition. Chamberlin’s
third model includes advertising expenditures as a non-functional
input but requires active price competition.
Figure 4.3 is a summary of the first model. In this model
equilibrium is attained when the market-share demand curve is
Figure 4.3. Chamberlin’s First Model of Monopolistic
Competition
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just tangent to the long-run average cost curve. The marginal
revenue and cost curves must intersect at the level of output at
which the average revenue and cost curves are tangent. This is
easily demonstrated. Let total revenue and total cost be given
by.
4.12a) TR = AR *q, and
4.12b) TC = AC • q.
Then thet marginal functions are
4.13a) MR = AR' • q + AR, and
4.13b) MC = LAC' • q + LAC.
Since the average revenue and average cost curves are tangent in
figure 4.3, the slopes of the curves and the levels of average
revenue and average cost are all equal at the point of tangency.
Thus equation 4.13a must equal equation 4.13b.
The model with active price competition is shown in figure
4.4. In this model, it is assumed that close, but not perfect,
substitutes exist for the firm's product. The curve dd is
referred to as the perceived demand curve and the curve DD is
referred to as the market-share demand curve.
Based upon the previous geometric argument, the marginal
*
revenue curve associated with dd must equal marginal cost at q .
Note that at equilibrium the market-share demand curve is steeper
10!)
Figure 4.4. Chamberlin’s Second Model of Monopolistic
Competition
than the perceived demand curve. By reference to equation 4.14,
it is obvious that the marginal revenue curve associated with the
market-share demand curve must lie below the marginal revenue
curve associated with the perceived demand curve.
4.14a) MR = AR' • q + AR
4.14b) mr = ar' • q + ar.
In equation 4.14 the levels of output and average revenue are
equal. The slopes of the average revenue curves are negative in
10b
value and that of the market-share curve is more negative than
the perceived curve. It therefore follows that while mr = MC,
since MR < mr, then the marginal revenue associated with the pro
rata curve lies belows the marginal cost curve. This situation
is depicted in figure 4.5. Chamberlin identifies in figure
4.5 as a stable equilibrium.
In this model while the firm thinks that it is profit
maximizing at qQ, indeed it is not doing so. It would in truth
maximize profits by reducing output to the level where MR = LMC,
or in figure 4.5.
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If firms were aware of the existence of the DD curve they
would restrict output and maximize profits at q^. The problem
with Chamberlin's model is that it assumes the firm never
recognizes the DD curve, and its associated MR curve. Surely the
firm would sooner or later experience an operational disruption
which would temporarily reduce output below qQ. The firm could
not help but observe that profits increased during the period of
reduced output.
If a firm becomes aware of the market-share demand, then it
will set output at q^, earn positive economic profits, and
attract entry. Entry will only cease when the DD curve is
tangent to the LAC curve shown in figure 4.3. Thus active price
competition would not be expected to persist in the long run.
In the limit, if perfect substitutes existed for the good
and firms did engage in active price competition, production
would occur at minimum average cost as shown in figure 4.6.
Chamberlin's third model concerns a monopolistically
competitive industry in which products are differentiated by the
psychological impact of advertising expenditures. Chamberlin
suggests that such expenditures are inconsistent with active
price competition.
In Chamberlin's third model advertising expenditures do not
directly enter the production function. However they are
functionally related to the ability of the firm to market its
$Figure 4.6. The Degenerate Case of Chamberlin's Second
Model
product. He assumes the existence of economies of scale with
respect to such expenditures. Chamberlin envisions a U-shaped
average cost of advertising curve as shown in figure 4.7. In
Chamberlin's analysis the level of output associated with the
minimum average cost of advertising is not necessarily the output
which minimizes the classical average cost associated with
functional inputs. When he makes the variable imputation for
such costs, the variable adjusted average cost curve and the
classical average cost curve are as shown in figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.7. Economies of Scale in Chamberlin’s Third Model
Figure 4.8. The Divergence of Optimal Scales of Production
in the Third Model
Chamberlin performs his analysis in three distinct steps. He
first considers price to be constant and examines variations in
advertising expenditures. He next considers advertising
expenditures as given and considers price movements. Finally he
combines the results of the two separate approaches.
In the first step Chamberlin concludes that for a given
price, the firm will adjust his advertising expenditures and
output to the level where price is equal to variable-adjusted
marginal cost. In figure 4.9, if the current market price is p^,
then the firm is assumed to maximize profits by producing output
0 “o ql q
Figure 4.9. The First Step in the Equilibrium Adjustment
Process
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Chamberlin notes that if price is equal to then the
advertising expenses incurred will be just sufficient to dispose
of the output. At this price and quantity surplus profits are
eliminated, while the minimum amount necessary to market the
output remains. He therefore concludes that firms must produce
at minimum variable-adjusted average cost in long-run
equilibrium. It is only at price p^ that there are no incentives
for entry.
This portion of his analysis contains two enigmas. First,
if products are differentiated, why is marginal revenue assumed
to be horizontal at p^ and p^? Second, this portion of the
analysis is distinguished by the notable absence of the market-
share demand curve so prevalent in his first two models.
In the second step of the analysis advertising expenditures
are considered fixed and price is allowed to adjust. This
situation is depicted in figure 4.10.
In figure 4.10 advertising expenditures are imputed as a
fixed cost. It is well-known that such imputations have no
effect on the marginal cost curve. If demand is DD in figure
4.10, the firm will maximize profits by finding the price and
output which maximizes profits. A position such as p^, q^ in
figure 10 would exist. At this stage of the analysis, Chamberlin
offers no explanation of how this profit maximizing output is
chosen. It is certainly not chosen under the assumption that
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Figure 4.10. The Second Step in the Equilibrium Adjustment
Process
marginal revenue is horizontal at p^. It seems to be implied
that the level of output is chosen by setting the marginal
revenue curve associated with the DD demand curve equal to
marginal cost.
In the third stage of Chamberlin's analysis he combines the
results of the first two stage as summarized in figure 4.11. In
this figure, the price and output would certainly appear stable
since at the equilibrium price and output any movement along DD
will surely result in a loss if advertising expenditures are
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Figure 4.11. The Third Step in the Equilibrium Adjustment
Process
fixed. In addition, at the costs of advertising expenditures
are being recovered whether these costs are viewed as variable
costs or as fixed costs. Since there are no residual profits,
there is no incentive for entry or exit.
Chamberlin also offers an explanation of the equilibrium
adjustment process. He assumes price is at a level such as p^ in
figure 4.12. Marginal revenue is assumed to be horizontal and
equal to pQ. By setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost,
the firm maximizes profits. When all firms do likewise it causes
Figure 4.12. An Alternative View of Disequilibrium in
Chamberlin's Third Model
each firm to bid up advertising expenditures. This has the
effect of rotating the AC^ and AC^, curves upward and to the
right according to Chamberlin. Equilibrium is reached when the
curves have rotated such that the variable-adjus ted average cost
curve is tangent to the price line at its minimum point. This
result is depicted in figure 4.13. It is only when the firm
produces at and p^ in figure 4.13 that price and advertising
expenditures are sufficient to allow the firm to market its
desired level of output.
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Figure 4.13. A Competitive Equilibrium in Chamberlins
Third Model
The results of this model are similar to those of the first
two models. These results depend upon the firm perceiving the
demand curve to be horizontal. It was shown earlier in the
discussion of Chamberlin's second model that such perceptions are
unlikely to continue in the long-run. In this case, however, the
assumption of a horizontal demand curve seems even more
unwarranted since the firms' products are differentiated. This
solution is also plagued by the failure of the marginal revenue
curve associated with the market-share demand curve to enter the
decision making calculus.
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It is Chamberlin's model of monopolistic competition
involving a non-functional input which is the most interesting of
the three models. It provides a basis for contrasting the
results of Greenhut's model and the realism of his assumptions.
Greenhut's Solution
In Greenhut's analysis, only that portion of entrepreneurial
services which is of a non-functional nature is considered. For
example, the input under consideration may be considered the
uncertainty associated with entrepreneurial investment. If
uncertainty were a functional input, the quantity of input would
directly enter the production function. Since non-functional
inputs do not enter the production function it is not possible to
employ traditional techniques to derive the set of cost curves
associated with production. The costs associated with non¬
functional inputs must be imputed and ascribed to the cost curves
associated with functional inputs. The failure of the non¬
functional input to directly enter the production function
creates an additional source of difficulty with respect to the
imputational process. In general, it is not possible to rely
upon a marginal productivity theory of distribution to determine
the opportunity cost of the input.
In the traditional analysis, the firm's demand for an input
is derived by optimizing profits where the production function
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has been substituted for quantity in the expression for total
revenue. The market demand is formed by summing the marginal
revenue product curves over all firms. The intersection of
market demand and supply determines the equilibrium price of the
functional factor of production. This market price may be taken
as the opportunity cost per unit of the input.
Consider labor as an example. An income-leisure model may
be employed to show that labor determines the optimal quantity of
work effort in the face of a parametrically determined wage rate.
But by letting wages vary, an individual supply curve of labor
may be derived. When these curves are aggregated over all units,
the market supply curve is determined. Thus the market wage
which evolves is the wage at which labor is maximizing utility.
In this sense, the wage rate is the dollar value necessary to
induce the input to provide the quantity of work effort necessary
for an equilibrium in the factor market to attain. But since
wage enters the production decision parametrically, it is also
the wage necessary for the attainment of equilibrium in the
product market. Since the wage rate is consistent with the
utility maximizing quantity of labor in equilibrium, the wage
rate covers all foregone opportunities of labor. It therefore
represents the opportunity cost per unit of labor.
In a production model involving non-functional inputs, the
marginal revenue product of the input may not be computed. The
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non-functional value of the input therefore creates two sources
of difficulty. First, because it does not directly enter the
production function, it is necessary to impute its value to the
costs of the functional inputs if the full set of costs curves is
to be derived. Second, it is not possible to employ marginal
productivity theory to derive the appropriate cost to be imputed.
Chamberlin's analysis more or less begs the question since
he imputes the "customary" expenditures for advertising services.
While Chamberlin does address issues concerning excess capacity
and monopolistic exploitation of inputs, he does not address
questions concerning the opportunity costs of the non-functional
input itself. He cannot therefore explain how the "customary"
level of expenditures is actually determined.
Greenhut's model directly addresses this issue. His model
indicates that in equilibrium not only is the full opportunity
cost of the entrepreneurial factor precisely covered, but
production occurs at the minimum levels of both classical and
variable-adjusted average cost.
Greenhut's expository approach is somewhat similar to that
of Chamberlin's. He begins with a fixed imputational process,
proceeds to a variable imputational process, and then reconciles
the two approaches. Greenhut's model was fully discussed in
Chapter II. In the following discussion his model is recon-
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sidered in such a way as to contrast the crucial methodological
differences between this model and that of Chamberlin. Since the
current issue is methodology, it is assumed that the reader may
refer to Chapter III for more technical detail.
The Fixed Imputation
Greenhut's fixed and variable imputations both depend upon
the opportunity costs of the entrepreneur and the relationship
between output and the required level of energy expenditures. In
this respect, his analysis immediatedly differentiates itself
from that of Chamberlin.
Chamberlin never addresses the issue of opportunity cost.
With respect to the relationship between the quantities of inputs
and outputs, Chamberlin explicitly assumed that economies of
scale exist with respect to average advertising expenditures. He
further assumes that the market-share demand curve of the firm is
dependent upon the level of advertising expenditures. While the
ability to produce output is not functionally related to
advertising expenditures, the ability to market is. It would
seem more appropriate to develop a model in which average revenue
is explicitly adjusted for advertising expenditures rather than
adjusting the cost curves.
In Greenhut's model, the location of the average revenue
curve is totally independent of the level of energy expenditures.
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Production in his model is characterized by equation 4.2 supra.
The level of energy expenditure enters his model in a discrete
manner. If the opportunity costs of entrepreneurial services are
not covered, no production occurs. If they are covered,
production is a function of capital and labor, but the level of
output is independent of the level of energy expenditures.
Furthermore, the level of output is viewed as calling forth
different levels of energy expenditures. For example, while
production does not require varying levels of uncertainty, it is
almost certain that different levels of output will be
accompanied by varying levels of uncertainty. The level of
energy expenditures does not functionally affect the production
function nor the average revenue function. It seems appropriate
to impute the opportunity cost as a fixed cost.
The next issue which naturally evolves is the level of
opportunity cost to be imputed as a fixed cost. For the present
assume the existence of an optimally-ordered opportunity cost per
unit of energy expenditure. Since various levels of output call
forth varying applications of energy expenditures, it is
necessary to ascertain the optimal level of energy expenditures
in order to know the base quantity of output at which the
imputation is to be made. Greenhut argues that the utility
maximizing level of energy expenditures must conform to the
output associated with minimum classical average cost.
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Otherwise, the entrpreneur will "tend to be a high cost
producer", [13, 70]. The conformability requirement is a
precondition for entering and remaining in the selected activity.
Greenhut notes that, "...the optimal energy performance of the
individual must conform to the prevailing technology in the
industry because if this were not the case the firm would be a
high-cost producer", [13, 96-97]. While Greenhut offers no
further explanation of why the imputation must occur at the
minimum level of classical average cost, this level of output
determines the optimal level of energy expenditures. Taken with
the optimally-ordered opportunity cost, it is sufficient to
determine the magnitude of the fixed-cost imputation.
It should be noted that Greenhut employs an arbitrage theory
of opportunity cost to determine the optimally-ordered factor
price. It is given by R^. The determination of Rq was addressed
in the previous chapter. It is the highest factor price the
entrepreneur could obtain in its best alternative employment.
This price is transformed to reflect the differences in economic
lifetimes and individual preferences for different activities.
The determination of the optimal level of output and required
energy expenditures will be separately addressed below.
Equilibrium under a fixed cost imputation is illustrated in
figure 4.14. Note that figure 4.14 has been constructed so that
the demand curve is tangent to the fixed-adjusted average cost
curve at the level of output at which classical average cost is
I
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Figure A.14 Fixed Cost Imputations and Oligopolistic
Equilibrium
minimized. Regardless of the location of Che demand curve) the
level of energy expenditures would vary from the optimally
ordered level at any other level of output. Since in equilibrium
the full opportunity costs of all factors must be covered,
production must occur at q^. Otherwise the entrepreneur would
exit the industry and no production would occur. If the demand
curve lay to the left of that shown in figure 4.. 14, the firm
would exit the industry since it could not recover its explicit
cos18 of production. If it lay to the right of the illustrated
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demand curve, excess profits would result in entry. Entry would
force the curve to shift leftward until a point of tangency
occurred. At revenues are sufficient to cover the full costs
of production including the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur.
The equilibrium is sustainable for three reasons. These is no
inducement for entry or exit. The entrepreneur is recovering his
opportunity cost R^, and applying his utility-maximizing level of
energy expenditures. The firm is maximizing profits since
marginal revenue must always equal marginal cost when the average
revenue curve is tangent to the adjusted average cost curve.
Note that Greenhut's fixed adjustment differs from that of
Chamberlin in several key respects. Chamberlinian tangencies are
based upon perceived demand curves which are either slightly
sloped or horizontal. If such curves were depicted to intersect
the curve D in figure 4.14 at point E, then perceived marginal
revenue would exceed marginal cost. Thus it would appear that
there is some inconsistency in Chamberlin's treatment of the
fixed-cost imputation. In Greenhut's analysis, there is no such
thing as a perceived demand curve. The firm is assumed to know
the location of its market-share demand curve. Thus Greenhut's
analysis is free of the methodological criticism noted earlier.
It was previously shown that Chamberlinian tangencies require
production consistent with mr = MC such that MR < MC. The firm
is assumed to remain ignorant of the DD and MR curves in
124
Chamberlinian models. In Greenhut's model, the behavior of the
firm is always consistent with the market since the firm always
equilibrates MR with MC. It suffers no illusions concerning
demand conditions.
In Chamberlin's model, the point of tangency between average
revenue and average cost is unrelated to the optimal quantity of
advertising expenditures, from the factors viewpoint. Production
in Greenhut's model always occurs at minimum classical average
cost. This is not expected to be the case in Chamberlin's model
due to the assumptions concerning economies of scale in
advertising expenditures.
The Variable Imputation
Greenhut's variable imputation is depicted in figure 4.15.
In Greenhut's variable imputation factor conformability is still
required. Thus at q^ the entrepreneur is applying the utility-
maximizing level of energy expenditures. The utility-maximizing
level of income is given by the area of the rectangle ABPOC.
Thus the vertical distance AB is the opportunity cost per unit of
energy expenditures, Rq.
At outputs less than q^, the entrepreneur is not receiving
the utility maximizing level of income or energy expenditures,
although Rq is optimally determined. To the right of q^ the same
is true. Since in equilibrium, factor markets as well as product
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Figure 4.15. Variable Cost Imputations and Oligopolistic
Equilibrium
markets must individually be in equilibrium, movements from
must represent factor market disequilibrium.
The fixed-cost ascription was viewed as the appropriate
adjustment from the firm's point of view since the opportunity
cost of the input must be paid or no production occurs. Such
opportunity costs are appropriately viewed as sunk costs. In
Chamberlin's model the variable-cost ascription was also viewed
from the firm's perspective. The variable cost ascription in
Greenhut's model serves a different purpose. It is employed to
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illustrate factor market disequilibrium where the level of output
deviates from the quantity associated with minimum classical
average cost.
Greenhut requires the utility maximizing level of energy
expenditures to be consistent with output q^ in figure 4.15.
This requirement is referred to as factor conformability. As
indicated previously, the appropriateness of factor
conformability will be addressed in some detail below. For the
moment conformability is assumed to hold.
Greenhut' s analysis assumes that e maps into q and that R e
maps into entrpreneurial cost per unit of output such that
average entrepreneurial cost is constant."^ In figure 4.15 the
distance between the variable-adjusted and classical average cost
curves is the same, irrepective of output.
In the following discussion the symbols e and q refer to the
optimal (equilibrium) values of energy expenditures and output.
The symbols e' and q' refer to the actual values of these
variables.
The required level of energy expenditures is given by
4.15) TC = R* e.
_ e _ _
1. In the following discussion the phrase "entrepreneurial
expense" will be used to refer to required rentals where such
rentals are a function of energy expenditures. The phrase
"entrepreneurial cost" will be used whenever such rentals are
related to the level of production. Furthermore, Greenhut does
provide for a variable average entrepreneurial cost function in
the appendix to chapter 5 of Theory of the Firm.
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This expense is to be allocated such that the total expense must
be recovered at the optimal level of output, q. By dividing
equation 4.15 by q, the rate per unit of energy expenditure, R,
is transformed into a rate per unit of output, <J> . Equation 4.16
therefore emerges:
4.16) TC' = <f> q' ,
e
where <f> is the average entrpreneurial cost associated with the
optimal level of output. The rate <p is to be charged per unit
of q', however.^
As a simple example, Greenhut cites the case where e' equals
q'. If e' equals q' (and e equals q) then total and average
entrepreneurial costs are given by
4.17) TC , = R • e ’ = R * q' , and
e
4.18) ACe, = R • q'/q' = R.
The difference between the variable-adjusted and classical
average cost curves will be given by the optimally ordered
opportunity cost per unit of entrepreneurial services, R. In
this example, any deviation from q^ in figure 4.15 must represent
suboptimal levels of income and energy expenditures. The
entrepreneur is receiving the correct rate per unit of e and q,
2. In general TC and TC , will only be equal at the optimal level
of output. However, as long as e' is positively related to q',
they will tend to move together.
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but expending suboptimal levels of energy expenditures.
Furthermore, the minimum points of the variable-adjusted and
classical average cost curves must occur at the same level of
output. The fixed-cost analysis indicated that equilibrium must
occur at the minimum level of classical average cost.
Equilibrium is therefore as depicted in figure 4.6. It does no
injury to the model to view the variable adjustment as redundant
since equilibrium is fully determinant based upon the fixed-cost
ascription. The variable ascription is useful, however, in
explaining the marginal calculus from the factor's perspective.
Point E in figure 4.16 represents a sustainable equilibrium
for reasons previously cited. At point E the entrepreneur is
applying the optimal level of energy expenditures at the
optimally ordered factor price, R, and receiving the utility
maximizing level of income.
For output less than q^, the entrepreneur fails to receive
the utility maximizing level of income due to a suboptimal level
of energy expenditures. The entrepreneur will receive the
optimally ordered opportunity cost per unit of energy
expenditures, R, however. For outputs larger than q^, the
entrepreneur receives a larger than optimal income by applying an
excessive quantity of energy expenditures.
One of the criticisms of Chamberlin's model is that it fails
to take into account the marginal calculus from the factor's
$Figure 4.16. Fixed and Variable Cost Imputations and
Oligopolistic Equilibrium
perspective. While Chamberlin employs a variable-cost
ascription, he never recognizes the implications of such a
procedure upon the marginal calculus.
In Greenhut's model market equilibrium requires that both
product markets and factor markets be simultaneously in
equilibrium. From the firm's perspective the fixed-cost
imputation is appropriate. Since fixed-cost imputations do not
affect marginal cost, the firm's marginal calculus requires
setting marginal revenue equal to classical marginal cost.
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From the factor's perspective, the relevant marginal cost
curve is the variable-adjusted marginal cost curve. It is also
necessary to employ a marginal revenue concept which reflects the
dual nature of the optimization problem. Greenhut refers to this
marginal revenue curve as the "artificially" adjusted marginal
revenue curve. The reference to an "artificial" adjustment is
unfortunate. Such an adjustment is not only appropriate but
required. It is necessary to adequately explain factor market
equilibrium where marginal productivity theory fails because of
the nature of production as given in equation 4.2.
The level of marginal revenue required for dual optimization
must always cover the required cost of the non-functional input.
Since utility maximization is assumed to conform to q^ in figure
4.16, the required level of entrpreneurial return is given by the
fixed sum,
4.19) TR = R * e = r.
e
The adjustment to marginal revenue is found by allocating this
required income over q' units of production. The required
marginal revenue curve is given by
4.20) MRr = MR + (R- e)/q' = MR + r/q',
where MR^ is required marginal revenue, MR is classical marginal
revenue, and r represents the income-earning aspirations of the
entrepreneur.
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The adjustment to marginal revenue must be sharply
distinguished from the adjustment to marginal cost. The latter
adjustment is given by the constant <|> . Greenhut also uses the
symbol r'/q for this adjustment to signify he is referring to the
variable cost adjustment, where
4.21) <#> = (R *e')/q = r'/q.
While these adjustments may seem incongruous at first
glance, they greatly facilitate the analysis of factor market
equilibrium. Suppose for example that classical marginal revenue
equals classical marginal cost at a level of output where q' < q,
and e'< e. In this situation the entrepreneur is applying a
suboptimal level of energy expenditures. The actual rental, r',
will be less than the desired rental, r. It will also be true
that adjusted marginal revenue exceeds adjusted marginal cost.
The entrepreneur will seek to expand output until actual rentals
equal desired rentals, or until
4.22) MR + r/q = MC + r'/q.
These adjustments permit the description of factor market
equilibrium in cost space without reference to marginal
productivity theory or utility-theoretic approaches.
Dual optimization requires both product market equilibrium
(MR = MC) and factor market equilibrium (MR^ = MC^,). In figure
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4.16, the MR^ curve is not drawn. At q^ the product market is in
equilibrium since marginal revenue equals marginal cost whenever
average revenue is tangent to fixed-adjusted average cost. The
factor market is in equilibrium since revenues are just
sufficient to cover classical production costs plus the required
rental of the entrepreneur. The required rate per unit of output
is the vertical distance between these curves, r/q. If r/q is
added to the marginal revenue curve at q^, adjusted marginal
revenue will equal adjusted marginal cost. The desired rental r
will equal the actual rental r'. Figure 4.16 thus reflects the
duality of the optimization procedure.
Greenhut, unlike Chamberlin, explicitly recognizes the
effect of variable cost ascriptions upon the marginal cost curve.
Whereas Chamberlin fails to adequately address the marginal
calculations which define equilibrium, Greenhut explicitly
describes these calculations for both the fixed and variable
ascriptions.
Chamberlin assumes that economies of scale are associated
with the average level of advertising expenditures. The level of
output associated with minimum variable-adjusted average cost
need not coincide with that associated with minimum classical
average cost. Greenhut utilizes a variable imputation which
insures average entrepreneurial cost is constant. This
imputation is sufficient for the coincidence of the outputs
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associated with the minimum points of each curve. Constant
average entrepreneurial cost is not a necessary condition for
this result, however. Factor conformability is the necessary and
sufficient condition for these results to attain.
Factor Conformability and Variable Cost
Ascriptions: A Utility-Theoretic Approach
It has been previously noted that Greenhut explicitly
assumes that the utility maximizing level of energy expenditures
must be consistent with minimum classical average cost in long-
run equilibrium. This concept is known as factor conformability.
Greenhut states:
Suppose technological conditions in the chosen
activity require t units of inputs in order to
produce at optimal efficiency but that t input
units entail entrepreneurial inputs greater or less
than 8. Then, the factor's energy preference does
not conform to technological conditions...When
technological conditions do not conform to the
entrepreneur's preferred schedule, the said
entrepreneur will tend to be a high cost producer.
But this means the entrepreneur will sooner or
later leave the field. Hence we may ignore as
entrepreneurial prospects those enterprisers who
expect that their optimal performance...will fail
to conform to the technological conditions of the
trade... [13, 70].
In order to fully appreciate Greenhut's model of entrepreneurial
rents, it is desirable to explore the nature of factor
conformability from a utility-theoretic approach. This approach
also yields significant new perspectives concerning the relevance
Income
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of the variable cost ascription. Figure 4.17 depicts a
traditional labor-leisure model such as found in Ferguson [9, 83-
87], The level of energy expenditures is measured along the
horizontal axis. The horizontal intercept, , denotes the
total number of energy units available per unit of time. If an
entrepreneur maximizes utility at point E, he consumes L units of
in leisure activity and e = - L units in work activity.
Furthermore, the wage rate (opportunity cost) per unit of energy
expenditures is given by the slope of the budget constraint.
In the traditional analysis, the supply curve of labor can
Figure 4.17. Utility Maximization in a Labor-Leisure Model
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be found by varying the wage rate and noting the utility
maximizing levels of energy expenditures forthcoming at each
wage. Summing across all individuals yields the market supply
curve of labor. Marginal productivity theory is utilized to
determine the firm and market demands for labor. Factor market
equilibrium determines the wage rate or the slope of the budget
constraint in figure 4.17. The individual maximizes utility
subject to the market wage constraint. He thus consumes L units
of leisure and e units of labor.
Where non-functional inputs are involved, marginal
productivity theory cannot be utilized in determining the
opportunity cost of the input. Greenhut assumes that the
opportunity cost per unit of energy expenditures is given by R.
It is the rate transformed from the rate in the next best
alternative. Consider a set of figures similar to figure 4.17
which apply to a number of potential employers offering various
wage rates, R^, but requiring different levels of energy
expenditures. The appropriate wage rate for imputational
procedures is that rate which leaves the entrepreneur indifferent
between the chosen activity and the next most preferred
alternative. This wage rate defines what Robinson refers to as
the "transfer price" of the entrepreneur [26, 104]. It is the
minimum price necessary to induce the entrepreneur to refrain
from exiting the firm.
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Consider figure 4.18 in which only the two best alternatives
are shown. Employment may be obtained in firm #2 a t an income of
$200 per week, requiring energy expenditures of 40 units per
week. In order to continue employment with firm #1, the
entrepreneur must obtain a wage that yields the same level of
utility for providing the required quantity of energy
expenditures, 60 units per week. Thus a line may be drawn from
the horizontal intercept tangent to the indifference curve. The
required wage rate is the slope of the budget constraint as
constructed for firm #1. This wage rate is the transfer price or
optimally ordered opportunity cost per unit of energy
expenditure, R. If firm #1 offers a wage rate less than R, the
entrepreneur will maximize utility by exiting firm #1 and moving
to firm #2. If firm #1 offers a higher wage, the firm will be a
high cost producer and will be displaced in the long run. Thus,
even though marginal productivity theory cannot be utilized to
determine the opportunity cost of entrepreneurial services, this
cost is well-defined.
The question naturally arises concerning the conformability
of the entrepreneur's preferences with the technical requirements
of the firm. In figure 4.18 for example, firm #1 may require 80
units of energy expenditures when the utility maximizing quantity
is 60 units. Greenhut assumes that the market for
entrepreneurial services is of sufficient breadth that a tangency
Firm#1Firm//2
Figure4.18.TheDeterminationofEntr preneurialOpport nityC s
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solution will exist. Thus the entrpreneur may exit firm #1 since
his preferences are not conformable to the technological
requirements of production. He will seek employment elsewhere
such that his preferences conform to the technological
requirements.
What if the entrepreneur's alternatives are so constrained
that in the utility maximizing employment conformability still
fails? Such a situation is depicted in figure 4.19. As an
extreme case suppose that only two alternatives exist. In each,
the technological requirements do not allow conformability. The
entrepreneur will exit firm #1 unless the wage rate is sufficient
to allow the entrepreneur to obtain the same level of utility
offered by firm #2. The transfer price or opportunity cost of
the entrepreneur is still given by the slope of the budget
constraint for firm #1. However, the desired level of energy
expenditures diverges from the technologically required level.
Greenhut refers to this situation as a state of indivisibility of
entrepreneurial services. He notes that, "It is when
indivisibility is combined with uncertainty that not only may e'
differ from e and r' from r but the lowest points on the adjusted
and classical LRAC curves must then occur at different outputs",
[13, 80]. In figure 4.19, the actual level of energy
expenditures is that level associated with point F while the
desired level is the level associated with point E. We defer for
Firm//1Firmit2
FigureA.19,Entrepren urialOpportunityC stitheAbs ncefFactoronformability
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the moment the portion of the citation which makes reference to
the minimum points of the variable-adjusted and classical average
cost curves. It will be shown below that average entrepreneurial
cost always reaches its minimum point at the level of output
associated with point E in figure 4.19.
While Greenhut explicitly recognizes the possibility of such
a divergence in the minimum points of the curves, he places
little stress upon it. He states that
...all industries develop a character such that owner
(s) - manager (s) are distributed over the hierarchy of
industry types in accordance with the demands each
places on these men and the costs of and consumer needs
for each good. The best officials available to an
industry working at their optimal efficiency mark the
long run of a fully employed free enterprise system...
[13, 84].
Conformability is therefore seen to require tangency solutions
such as depicted in figure 18 rather than the pathological case
in figure 19. It requires the identity of the utility maximizing
level of energy expenditures with the technologically required
level of energy expenditure in long-run equilibrium.
The utility-theoretic approach is also helpful in
establishing the properties of the average entrepreneurial cost
curve. If this curve is horizontal, then the outputs associated
with minimum variable-adjusted cost and minimum classical average
cost will coincide. If average entrepreneurial cost is convex in
output but reaches its minimum at the level of output which
